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ABSTRACT
Partisan gerrymandering has proliferated in the last two decades, yet the Supreme Court has declined to rein in the
offense by identifying a judicially manageable standard for evaluating claims in federal courts. This Article
highlights a second, promising path to remediating partisan gerrymandering: claims in state courts. In the
American federal system, state courts are the arbiters of their own constitutions and statutes and are allowed to
offer protections that go beyond those afforded by the Federal Constitution. We begin by discussing the U.S.
Supreme Court’s opinion in Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018), which lays out two distinct theories
for evaluating partisan gerrymandering claims, either on a statewide basis, or on a district-by-district basis. The
reasoning in these theories emanates from the U.S. Constitution, but state constitutions contain similar principles,
including protection of freedom of association and equal protection of the law. Because states are free to confer
more voting rights protections than those contained in federal doctrine, these avenues are in no way foreclosed by
the recent Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019), decision. We also highlight unique state
constitutional provisions with no analog in federal law, such as guarantees of free and fair elections and
prohibitions on the passage of special laws. We conclude by reviewing states where partisan gerrymandering
offenses are likely, with special focus on states with potentially receptive courts, most recently North Carolina. The
Article is accompanied by two Appendices: one listing state court precedents striking down election laws and
redistricting plans under theories of state law, and one listing constitutional protections that could be cited in a
partisan gerrymandering complaint. In summary, this Article seeks to provide a coherent theoretical framework
for challenging partisan gerrymanders using federalist principles.
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INTRODUCTION
I believe that the time for plain speaking has arrived in relation to the outrageous
practice of gerrymandering, which has become so common, and has so long been
indulged in, without rebuke, that it threatens not only the peace of the people, but
the permanency of our free institutions. The courts alone, in this respect, can save
the rights of the people and give to them a fair count and equality in representation.

—Giddings v. Blacker (1892) (Morse, C.J., concurring)1

Until recently, redistricting was not considered a topic to move the hearts
of voters. But over the past decade, gerrymandering, the practice of
manipulating district lines for the benefit of one group or candidate to the
detriment of others, has taken center stage in American politics.
Gerrymandering is the subject of voter initiatives, news articles, and even
commemorative jewelry in the shape of creatively-drawn districts.2 And legal
challenges to redistricting plans have proliferated.
This wave of new interest coincides with increases in partisan
gerrymandering. The last few decades have been a time of narrowly divided
national sentiment. Under such circumstances, electoral advantages accrue
by prevailing in close contests. In the several cycles before the 2000s,
redistricting disputes focused largely on individual districts and targeted
racial groups. Since 2000, a record number of statewide district plans have
1
2

Giddings v. Blacker, 52 N.W. 944, 948 (Mich. 1892) (Morse, C.J., concurring).
GERRYMANDER JEWELRY, http://www.gerrymanderjewelry.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
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given an advantage to a whole political party.3 Thus gerrymandering has
emerged as a newly significant threat to fair representation of the major
parties.
Record partisan gerrymandering has been enabled by three factors:
means, motive, and opportunity. The means comes from partisan loyalty,
which has reached new heights.4 The increased clustering of like-minded
voters by location leads to communities with different voting behavior which
can be separated by district lines.5 Partisan voter loyalty enables the use of
sophisticated map-drawing technology to produce reliable election outcomes
in greater numbers than would arise under neutral principles.6 The
motivation emerges from the sharpened partisanship of U.S. politics, in
which the ideological distance between the two major political parties has
steadily increased since the 1970s, making legislative compromise less likely.7
The rewards of gerrymandering are greatest in states with close partisan
divisions, where over one-third of the seats can swing purely as a function of
redistricting.8 With control of the U.S. House or a state legislature in the
3

4

5

6

7

8

See Sam Wang & Brian Remlinger, Slaying the Partisan Gerrymander, AM. PROSPECT (Fall 2017),
https://prospect.org/article/slaying-partisan-gerrymander.
See Alan I. Abramowitz & Steven W. Webster, Taking It to A New Level: Negative Partisanship,
Voter Anger and the 2016 Presidential Election 1 (Nov. 9–10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at https://www.uakron.edu/bliss/state-of-the-parties/papers/abramowitz+webster.pdf)
(describing the trend of increasingly negative partisanship in the United States in the 21st Century).
See BILL BISHOP & ROBERT G. CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKEMINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART, 5–7 (2008).
The Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law maintains an excellent
web page on ongoing redistricting litigation. Michael Li, Thomas Wolf, & Annie Lo, The State of
Redistricting Litigation, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (last updated Sept. 13, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/state-redistricting-litigation. Justin Levitt, a professor at
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, maintains an excellent website summarizing redistricting
litigation from the 2010 and 2000 redistricting cycles.
See All About Redistricting,
http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
See David R. Jones, Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock, 54 POL. RES. Q. 125 (2001); Sheryl G.
Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, As Gridlock Deepens in Congress, Only Gloom is Bipartisan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/us/politics/congress-dysfunction-conspirac
ies-trump.html.
For example, between 2010 and 2012, the North Carolina House delegation swung from 8
Democrats, 5 Republicans to 10 Republicans, 3 Democrats despite the statewide vote moving
toward Democrats. This move of 5 seats represented over one-third of the 13-seat delegation. See
2010 Federal Elections, NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS RESULTS,
https://er.ncsbe.gov/?election_dt=11/02/2010&county_id=0&office=FED&contest=0
(last
visited Oct. 11, 2019); 2012 Federal Elections, NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS
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balance, manipulating even a small number of seats can take on central
significance.
The final factor, opportunity, arrived with the wave election of 2010.9
Partisan gerrymandering is enabled when redistricting comes under the
control of a single party.10 For Republicans this occurred in Florida,
Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.11 On the
Democratic side, one state, Maryland, has shown clear evidence for partisan
representational distortion since 2012.
The net consequence of these gerrymanders was to ensure nearly 100
safe or nearly-safe House seats in total for Democrats and Republicans
combined. In the wave election of 2018, 46 out of 435 House seats changed
partisan hands, an incumbent-party loss rate of nearly 11%.12 In contrast, in
the five states with surviving gerrymanders (Maryland, Michigan, North
Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin), the incumbent party lost reelection only 3%
of the time in the 2018 midterms.13 Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania, where
districts were overturned by a state court, four out of eighteen seats flipped
parties, or 22%.14 These election results show that while incumbents are reelected more often than not, the placement of district lines can strongly
influence their odds of survival.15 Representationally speaking, the net result
of gerrymandering this decade was that Republicans won about a dozen

9

10

11

12

13
14
15

RESULTS, https://er.ncsbe.gov/?election_dt=11/06/2012&county_id=0&office=FED&contest
=0. (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
For a discussion on what constitutes a “wave election,” see Charlie Cook, Midterm Elections Could Be
a Wave, But Who's Going to Drown?, YAHOO! NEWS (July 30, 2013), https://news.yahoo.com/
midterm-elections-could-wave-whos-going-drown-080230757.html.
In most states, this is referred to as a “trifecta,” in which one party controls both chambers of the
legislature and the governorship. However, there are some variations, such as in North Carolina,
where the governor plays no role in the redistricting process. See Who Draws the Maps? Legislative and
Congressional Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.brennan
center.org/analysis/who-draws-maps-states-redrawing-congressional-and-state-district-lines.
See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV.
1263, 1263–1321 (2016).
See Results of the House of Representatives Elections to the United States Congress, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_2018 (last visited
Oct. 11, 2019).
Sam Wang, Letter to the Editor, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2018, https://www.economist.com/
letters/2019/01/19/letters.
Id.
Id.
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additional seats in Congress compared with neutral districting principles, and
many more state legislative seats.16
Partisan gerrymanders and other forms of gerrymandering are not
mutually exclusive. Race and class have become better predictors of party
voting preference, a phenomenon called conjoined polarization.17 These
increasingly tight links create incentives for partisans to commit other types
of gerrymander, including the packing or cracking of minorities as a means
of achieving an overall advantage. In some but not all cases, these offenses
are covered by federal law concerning the use of race in redistricting.18
Because partisan gerrymandering removes general elections as a route
for removing legislators, reformers have turned to courts for relief.19 But
unlike race-based redistricting doctrine, partisan gerrymandering doctrine is
incomplete.
After decades of flirting with the idea that partisan
gerrymanders are justiciable,20 the Supreme Court declined this year to
articulate a standard for discerning permissible versus impermissible
partisanship in redistricting, failing at the last moment in two bitterly divided

16

17

18

19

20

See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV.
1263, 1298–99 (2016).
See Bruce Cain & Emily Zhang, Blurred Lines: Conjoined Polarization and Voting Rights, 77 OHIO ST. L.
J. 867, 869 (2016) (defining conjoined polarization as the alignment of race, party, and ideology—
particularly since the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965).
Race-based redistricting law focuses on protecting the interests of minority groups with a history of
discriminatory treatment by creating districts in which they have an opportunity to elect candidates
of their choice. Racial gerrymandering, meanwhile, polices the use of race in redistricting in any
form, whether benevolent (to help minority groups) or malevolent (to harm minority groups). The
power of an individual vote is deemed to be diluted under federal law in two ways: as a
constitutional doctrine under the Fifteenth Amendment and as a statutory cause of action under
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding that
the restructuring of electoral district lines to deny equal representation to African-Americans
violated the Fifteenth Amendment). The future of these doctrines is uncertain as the Supreme
Court has declared other, related protections for minority groups to be unconstitutional in recent
years. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down section 4(b) of the Voting
Rights Act, whose formula delineated those jurisdictions required to obtain “preclearance” before
making any changes to their election laws, as unconstitutional as applied).
See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934–35 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (“Partisan
gerrymandering, as this Court has recognized, is ‘incompatible with democratic principles.’ More
effectively every day, that practice enables politicians to entrench themselves in power against the
people’s will. And only the courts can do anything to remedy the problem, because gerrymanders
benefit those who control the political branches.”) (internal citations omitted).
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 110 (1986).
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opinions in Rucho v. Common Cause.21 However, the route leading to that
failure generated concepts and theories that are now available for state courts
to use if they so choose.
In Davis v. Bandemer, the Supreme Court held that partisan
gerrymandering could violate the Equal Protection Clause.22 Since that
time, plaintiffs, advocacy groups, and academics have sought to develop a
judicially manageable test for partisan gerrymandering claims. Nearly
twenty years passed between Bandemer and the next partisan gerrymandering
case to reach the Court, Vieth v. Jubelirer.23 A plurality of four Justices in Vieth
wrote that the failure of lower courts to coalesce behind a single standard
meant there was no judicially discernable standard, and that partisan
gerrymandering claims should be declared non-justiciable.24 The four
dissenting Justices could not agree on a single standard. Writing separately,
Justice Kennedy suggested that advances in technology might yet lead to a
judicially manageable standard based on statewide harms under the First
Amendment.25
Reformers then sought to create standards which Justice Kennedy could
accept. But in the spring of 2018, when two cases26 with new legal theories
came before the Supreme Court, the Court sent the cases back to the district
courts on narrow procedural grounds. Less than two weeks later, Justice
Kennedy retired.27
Justice Kennedy’s replacement, Justice Brett
Kavanaugh, was suspected to be less receptive than Kennedy on questions
of voting rights.28 Thus it fell to Chief Justice Roberts, likely the deciding
vote, to face the challenge of how and whether to address partisan

21
22
23
24
25
26
27

28

139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 110.
541 U.S. 267 (2004).
Id. (plurality opinion).
Id. at 312–13 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018); Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018).
See Michael Wines, Kennedy’s Exit Could Cripple Efforts to Abolish Gerrymandering, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
2018, at A24.
See Sarah Jones, We’re About to Find Out What Brett Kavanaugh Thinks of Gerrymandering, N.Y. MAGAZINE,
Jan. 4, 2019, http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/01/the-supreme-court-will-take-up-gerry
mandering-in-march.html (“The court’s makeup has obviously changed since it declined to
consider gerrymandering cases in June; Brett Kavanaugh is now a justice, which tilts the court even
more dramatically to the right. That shift, combined with the court’s own record on voting rights,
makes the court’s possible rulings difficult to predict.”).
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gerrymandering without further harming the Court’s reputation.29 In a
divisive 5–4 opinion written by the Chief Justice, the Court declared partisan
gerrymandering to be a non-justiciable question, punting the issue to the
political branches of the government and to the states.30
In its failure to act in Rucho, the Supreme Court declined to continue the
work it began in Gill v. Whitford, which laid out two intellectual frameworks
for action, one by Chief Justice Roberts and one by Justice Kagan. Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous court, had suggested that voter
rights could be harmed on a district-by-district basis under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, analogous to the Court’s
pre-existing racial gerrymandering doctrine.31 Justice Kagan’s concurrence,
joined by the Court’s liberal justices, described a harm that could come to an
entire party or group of partisan voters on a statewide basis under the First
Amendment’s protections of speech and association.32
Even though the Supreme Court did not use these theories to put federal
guardrails on the practice of partisan gerrymandering, judges in other courts
still can. All state constitutions protect freedom of speech, forty-seven protect
the freedom of association, and twenty-four guarantee the equal protection
of the laws.33 All of these rights have counterparts in the Federal
Constitution. And under the well-known principle of federalism, state
constitutions can offer residents greater protections than afforded by the U.S.
Constitution.34 For this reason, state courts present an attractive route
toward achieving reform.
For many reasons, state constitutional litigation in state courts has been
an “under-the-radar” method of attacking illegal district maps. Perhaps the
29

30
31
32
33

34

See Joan Biskupic, 9-0 Ruling Masks Deep Divisions on Gerrymandering at Supreme Court, CNN POLITICS,
June 21, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/18/politics/gerrymandering-roberts-kagansupreme-court/index.html.
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
See id. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring).
See James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from State Constitutional Attempts to
Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 887–89 (2006) (discussing state constitutions and how
courts have historically applied them to partisan gerrymanders).
See, e.g., Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond: Enhancing Protection for Abortion Rights Through
State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 469 (2009) (discussing how some state
constitutions provide greater abortion rights than those embodied in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, and how state constitutional litigation can enhance those protections in the event
that Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), is overturned).
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most significant reasons are that (1) following the Warren revolution on the
U.S. Supreme Court, the federal system became a staunch defender of
fundamental rights, including the right to vote; and (2) state courts have
historically been perceived as either themselves partisan or susceptible to
undue influence from the partisan branches of their respective
governments.35 The broader redistricting reform movement, particularly in
the thirty-plus years since Bandemer, has focused on achieving a federal
solution rather than pursuing reform in individual states. Scholarly efforts
have focused on federal issues. Here we turn the spotlight to state-level efforts
and review examples in which state courts have served as a successful venue
for changing district plans. We will organize the examples into a theoretical
framework, setting the stage for a more systematic approach in state courts
and providing a primer for litigants and activists.
Reformers won a landmark victory in 2018, not in the U.S. Supreme
Court, but in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania was the
keystone in the Republican Party’s strategy for national dominance in
Congress: despite winning 51%, 44% and 46% of the statewide two-party
vote share for Congress in 2012, 2014, and 2016, Democrats won only 28%
of the state’s Congressional seats each year.36 In response to this disparity
between votes cast and seats won, plaintiffs brought a lawsuit alleging that
the Pennsylvania congressional districting plan violated the Free and Equal
Elections Clause of the Commonwealth’s Constitution.37
In its opening paragraph, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court laid out its
argument for why the Commonwealth’s founding document offered the
petitioners relief the U.S. Constitution could not:
It is a core principle of our republican form of government that voters should
choose their politicians, not the other way around. . . . While federal courts

35

36

37

See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 88 (Westlaw rev. ed. 2019) (“The protections in the Federal
Constitution provide a constitutional floor such that the Federal Constitution establishes a
minimum level of protection to citizens of all states, but nothing prevents a state court from equaling
or exceeding the federal standard. In other words, a state constitution may be construed to afford
broader but not narrower rights than similar federal constitutional provisions.”).
See Tests, PRINCETON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT, gerrymander.princeton.edu/tests/ (click the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on the interactive map; click the left arrow next to the year
displayed in the upper right-hand corner until you reach the reports analyzing data on the 2012,
2014, and 2016 congressional elections, respectively) (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
See League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
Oct. 29, 2018, https://www.brennancenter.org/legal-work/league-women-voters-v-pennslyvania.
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have, to date, been unable to settle on a workable standard by which to assess
such claims under the federal Constitution, we find no such barriers under
our great Pennsylvania charter. The people of this Commonwealth should
never lose sight of the fact that, in its protection of essential rights, our
founding document is the ancestor, not the offspring, of the federal
Constitution. We conclude that, in this matter, it provides a constitutional
standard, and remedy, even if the federal charter does not. Specifically, we
hold that the 2011 Plan violates Article I, Section 5—the Free and Equal
Elections Clause—of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 38

By declaring its founding document a better guarantor of personal liberty
than the Federal Constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court achieved
two goals: it undid years of harm to its citizens, and it did so in a way that
could not be reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. When the legislative
defendants tried to appeal the opinion to the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice
Samuel Alito, the Justice responsible for emergency appeals from the Third
Circuit, summarily rejected the request without consulting his colleagues.39
In the end, Pennsylvania’s congressional map was redrawn, and the
November 2018 election resulted in a 55% Democratic, 45% Republican
statewide vote and a 9-9 congressional split.40
A second victory for reformers came in September 2019 via a North
Carolina case, Common Cause v. Lewis.41 That case, heard in the Superior
Court of North Carolina, concerned the maps for both chambers of the
General Assembly, which had previously been partially redrawn in response
to a finding of racial gerrymandering. The unanimous decision by three
judges, two Democrats and one Republican, found that both the House and
Senate maps violated four separate clauses of Article I of the state
constitution: section 10, the free elections clause; section 12, concerning
freedom of assembly; section 14, concerning freedom of speech; and section
19, concerning equal protection. The court directed that the gerrymandered
38

39

40

41

League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 740–41, (Pa.), cert. denied sub nom.
Turzai v. Brandt, 139 S. Ct. 445 (2018) (mem.) (internal citations omitted).
See Sam Wang, Pennsylvania Congressional Gerrymander Overturned – and It Seems Likely to Stick,
PRINCETON ELECTION CONSORTIUM, Feb. 5, 2018, http://election.princeton.edu
/2018/01/22/pennsylvania-congressional-gerrymander-overturned-and-its-likely-to-stick/#more
-20320 (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
See Tests, PRINCETON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT, gerrymander.princeton.edu/tests/ (click the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on the interactive map; as of October 2019, the 2018 election map
automatically appears; if a later year appears, click on the arrow left of the year to scroll to the
appropriate Congressional election year) (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
Common Cause v. Lewis, 18 CVS 014001, slip op. (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019).
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maps may not be used for the 2020 election. It further directed that the
General Assembly redraw both maps without favoring a political party or
using election data, at public hearings and in full public view.42 The remedial
line-drawing process occurred over an eight-day period with legislators
relying on maps algorithmically created by Dr. Jowei Chen.43 At the end of
the process, the plaintiffs accepted the new Senate map, but objected to the
House districts in two county clusters as being an insufficient remedy. As of
this writing, their appeal is pending in the state court of appeals.44 On the
same day as the Common Cause plaintiffs filed their objections, another lawsuit,
Harper v. Lewis, was filed challenging North Carolina's congressional districts
based upon claims mirroring those in Common Cause v. Lewis.45 The same
three-judge court has been assigned to Harper as heard Common Cause,
and a new Congressional map for 2020 appears likely.46
In this Article, we argue that it is time to look beyond federal courts for
solutions. With the Supreme Court’s move toward a more restrictive
interpretation of voting rights under the U.S. Constitution, the way forward
for election reform there is uncertain, especially for cases with partisan
overtones. We propose that reformers should instead follow the examples of
Pennsylvania and North Carolina and turn to state courts and state
constitutions to achieve their goals. While lacking the sweeping breadth of a
U.S. Supreme Court opinion, claims based on state law in state courts have
three distinct advantages: (i) they can avoid removal to a federal venue; (ii)
they can base their arguments in legal provisions that are broader than the
First and Fourteenth Amendments alone; and (iii) they can interpret their
42
43

44

45

46

Id. at 349.
See Melissa Boughton, It’s Up to the Court Now: A Redistricting Update After the Final Round of Filings, N.C.
POL’Y WATCH (Oct. 10, 2019), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2019/10/10/its-up-to-the-courtnow-a-redistricting-update-after-the-final-round-of-filings/.
Order Denying Petition for Discretionary Review and Motion to Suspend Appellate Rules,
Common Cause v. Lewis, 18 CVS 014001 (Sup. Ct. N.C. Nov. 15, 2019) (available at
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/2019-11-15-Order.pdf) (denying a
motion asking the state supreme court to review the petition prior to a state court of appeals
decision).
Complaint, Harper v. Lewis, 19 CVS 012667 (Wake Cty. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 2019) (available at
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/2019-09-27-Harper%20v.%20Le
wis%20Complaint.pdf).
See Melissa Boughton, It’s Up to the Court Now: A Redistricting Update After the Final Round of Filings, N.C.
POL’Y WATCH (Oct. 10, 2019), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2019/10/10/its-up-to-the-courtnow-a-redistricting-update-after-the-final-round-of-filings/.
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constitutional provisions with federal analogues more broadly than the U.S.
Supreme Court interprets the federal clauses.47
In Part I, we analyze the history of the U.S. Supreme Court’s voting
rights jurisprudence, laying out an argument for why the Court has struggled
to reach a consensus on a justiciable partisan gerrymandering standard. Part
II analyzes the district-by-district and statewide theories articulated in Gill v.
Whitford more fully, creating two different groupings within which state
constitutional provisions could fall. It also briefly describes the types of
evidence plaintiffs would need to prove standing under either standard,
drawing from legal opinions and scholarship. Part III surveys the types of
protections offered by individual states, and how they fit into the district-bydistrict and statewide frameworks established by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Kagan. It also surveys a rich history of state supreme court cases
striking down districting plans under state law, demonstrating that state
courts are not dispositionally opposed to ruling on such claims. Part IV
briefly summarizes the types of evidence plaintiffs will need to bring
successful claims under these various constitutional provisions. Part V
evaluates legal routes in states with present and potential post-2020
gerrymanders.

47

Under the United States’ federal system, state courts are the final arbiters of their own laws and
constitutions, so long as they do not conflict with federal doctrine. This gives state courts a choice:
they can either interpret their constitutional protections of things like Due Process, Equal
Protection, or Freedoms of Speech and Association to be identical to their federal analogues, or
they can interpret them more broadly than their federal analogues. If a state court chooses to follow
the former path, the state is said to interpret its constitution in “lockstep” with the federal provision.
When a state interprets its own constitutional provision in lockstep with a federal analog, the U.S.
Supreme Court retains the right to review a state court interpretation of its own constitutional
provision for fidelity to precedents interpreting the federal clause. But if a state does not interpret
its constitutional provisions in lockstep with federal analogues, state courts are free to interpret their
constitutions as offering greater protections than the Federal Constitution.
See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.462, 476 (1983); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 550-51 (1986); William Brennan,
Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Andrew A.
Matthews, Jr., The State Courts and the Federal Common Law, 27 ALB. L. REV. 73, 76 (1963). For more
information on lockstep, see Daniel Hessel, Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Under State
Constitutions, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., July 17, 2018, https://campaignlegal.org/
sites/default/files/2018-07/CLC%20Issue%20Brief%20Litigating%20Partisan%20Gerrymande
ring%20under%20State%20Constitutions_0.pdf.
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I. VOTING, REPRESENTATION, AND THE THREE TIERS OF VOTING
RIGHTS
The phrase “voting rights” typically evokes laws and processes such as
voter registration and identification laws, or long lines at polling places.48
These are examples of the individual right to vote. But even if all citizens
were to gain and use their right to vote, they can still be denied fair
representation. This broader concept of voting rights requires a theory about
how groups of voters ought to be represented, whether the groups are sorted
by race, ethnicity, party, or some other classification.
Professor Pamela Karlan articulated this multi-tier framework of voting
rights in her article All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy.49
Detailing the Court’s precedents from Colegrove v. Green50 to Shaw v. Reno,51
Professor Karlan highlights how the Supreme Court has slowly pivoted from
a position of avoiding the “political thicket” to entering it for limited
purposes.52 In the first tier of individual voting rights, Wesberry v. Sanders53
and Reynolds v. Sims,54 the Court guaranteed the right of every qualified citizen
to have his or her ballot counted.55 A second tier of voting rights occurs at
the group level: the right of a group of citizens to have their votes aggregated
in a way that gave them a chance of winning an election (aggregation rights).
At this level, the Court has made some progress in the domain of race.
The most prominent examples of court involvement in aggregation rights
arise from the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act. Because
American representative democracy centers around the geographic
aggregation of votes into districts, rather than proportional representation,
48

49

50
51
52
53
54
55

This conception of the “right to vote” is typically thought of as a right possessed by the individual
which is abridged by administrative burdens, such as Voter ID laws, long lines at polling places,
and issues regarding the counting of ballots. As with the protections discussed infra, state
constitutions frequently protect the right to vote. For a more in-depth view of state constitutional
guarantees of the right to vote, see Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67
VAND. L. REV. 89, 101–05 (2014).
See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 247 (1993).
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
See Karlan, supra note 49, at 247.
367 U.S. 1 (1964).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
See Karlan, supra note 49, at 245.

216

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:1

aggregation cases necessarily center around how those boundaries are
drawn.56 Unlike participation barriers such as poll taxes or literacy tests,
challenges to aggregation barriers, namely cracking and packing,57 are not
fundamental rights subject to strict scrutiny under the Due Process Clause,
nor are political parties or their voters suspect classes under the Equal
Protection Clause;58 instead, challengers must prove both discriminatory
intent and discriminatory effect to win their constitutional claims.59
The third tier of voting rights has been the most challenging to police:
the right of voters whose candidates were victorious to have their
representatives participate in the process of governing (governance rights).
The Voting Rights Act guarantees to qualifying minority groups60 certain
aggregation rights, but no governance rights. This can create problems for
minority groups trying to achieve the policy goals their very representatives,
elected to legislative bodies as a result of districts created by the Voting Rights
Act, seek to achieve. As Professor Karlan notes:
Aggregation and governance interests do not always point toward the same
[districting] plan. A plan that maximizes the number of representatives a
group directly elects could produce a generally unfriendly legislature. For
example, the creation of majority-black districts may enable black voters to
elect some representatives to an assembly but may result in the election of
hostile delegates from the remaining, majority-white districts; if the black
community’s representatives are consistently outvoted within the legislature,
the black community may have achieved its aggregation interest at the
expense of a real role in governance. Thus, apportionment poses
fundamental choices about the nature of representation and the right to
vote.61

56

57

58

59
60
61

See id. at 249 (“Perhaps the most pervasive set of aggregation rules in American politics concerns
the geographical allocation of voters among electoral jurisdictions. The way in which districts are
drawn often determines which voters will be able to elect their preferred candidates and which
voters will have their preferences go unsatisfied.”).
See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV.
1263, 1271 (2016) (defining cracking and packing).
Id. at 252–53 (internal citations omitted). It should be noted that there are certain fundamental
rights which are subject to lower levels of scrutiny, such as the right to vote in the context of voter
ID laws. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion)
(applying Anderson-Burdick balancing to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to
Indiana’s voter ID law).
Karlan, supra note 49, at 250.
See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 12 (2009); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.12 (1986).
Karlan, supra note 49, at 252–53 (internal citations omitted).
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Partisan gerrymandering straddles the line between aggregation rights
and governance rights. Because partisan gerrymandering directly affects the
ability of a party to enact a political agenda, it may create a concern that
courts would have to go beyond what has worked for aggregation-type rights,
i.e., apply a mechanical rule to a districting plan to determine if it is
constitutional or not.62 Even presuming partisan intent, partisan effect is
nuanced for several reasons. First, party is a malleable characteristic, unlike
race. Second, a major party’s strength among voters is more likely than that
of a minority group to be at near-parity with the side that commits the
offense. For these reasons, the establishment of a doctrine to handle partisan
gerrymandering requires courts to break new intellectual ground.
Some reformers sought to find a simple mathematical rule for identifying
partisan gerrymanders which go “too far.” Their hope was to apply
advances in political science to create a bright-line test for revealing when a
partisan gerrymander has occurred. In his Vieth concurrence, Justice
Kennedy put lower courts on notice that they should be ready to order relief
should such a standard emerge. In response, academics from mathematical,
scientific, and social-scientific disciplines offered a variety of measures, each
quantifying a different aspect of the fairness of either a single district’s
election or a statewide set of elections.63 In some cases, the mathematical
tools were designed specifically for the problem of representation;64 other
tools had a long history going back as far as a century of use in other practical
domains such as the manufacture of beer.65 Importantly, many tools
measure the degree to which districts are packed or cracked in the aggregate,
but without explicitly relying on the amount of representation won by either
side.66 In all cases, the measures were designed to convert electoral
unfairness into a numerical measure that would be useful to courts.
62
63
64

65

66

Karlan, supra note 49, at 253.
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82
U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 884 (2014); see also Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional
Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 242 (2013).
See Brief for Heather K. Gerken et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 19, Gill v. Whitford,
138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161).
Relying on the amount of representation won by either party has been criticized as a form of
proportional representation. Even if a mathematical measure does not hold up the ideal of strict
proportionality, using the number of wins in any way might be criticized as imposing a view as to
the outcome that ought to arise from a statewide vote total. Some mathematical approaches instead
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II. GILL V. WHITFORD GIVES RISE TO TWO APPROACHES FOR
ANALYZING PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS, DISTRICT-BY-DISTRICT AND
STATEWIDE
Gill v. Whitford and Benisek v. Lamone arose from two extreme gerrymanders
of the 2010 redistricting cycle: Wisconsin’s State Assembly and Maryland’s
Sixth Congressional District, respectively.
Following the 2010 elections, Republicans found themselves newly in
control of Wisconsin’s legislature and governor’s mansion, giving them
control over the state’s redistricting process. The legislature drew state
legislative and congressional maps designed to provide a durable advantage
over election outcomes for the decade.
In Maryland, Democrats already dominated state politics. In the
redistricting process, they sought to enlarge their 6-2 majority in the state’s
Congressional delegation. Targeting a long-time Republican incumbent
from the state’s rural western mountain district, Democrats redrew the Sixth
District to turn an R+13% district in the 2010 election into a D+2% district
in the 2012 election, bringing the Congressional delegation to seven
Democrats, one Republican.67
In Wisconsin, Bill Whitford and co-plaintiffs sued the State of Wisconsin
and the General Assembly in federal court, arguing the State Assembly maps
were so biased in favor of Republicans that they violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.68 Plaintiffs relied on a new measure of partisan
symmetry, the efficiency gap, as well as partisan bias and demonstrative
maps. Relying on all of the measures, the district court struck down the State
Assembly map as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.69 This was the

67

68

69

use the pattern of win margins to detect whether one side’s voters have been systematically packed
or cracked. Such tests escape the proportional-representation problem, and have been broadly
termed tests of inequality of opportunity. See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Brian Remlinger, and Ben
Williams, An Antidote for Gobbledygook: Organizing the Judge’s Partisan Gerrymandering Toolkit into Tests of
Opportunity and Outcome, 17 Election L.J. 302 (2018).
Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799, 826 (D. Md. 2017) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting), aff'd, 138 S.
Ct. 1942 (2018). The Partisan Voter Index (PVI) measures how strongly a United States
congressional district or state leans toward the Democratic or Republican Party, compared to the
nation as a whole. A rating of R+13% means that a district’s Republican partisan vote share is
thirteen points larger than the national average.
See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (remanding that initial suit to permit voters to prove
particularized harms).
See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
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first time in nearly three decades that a federal court had struck down a
redistricting plan on partisan gerrymandering grounds.
The plaintiffs in Benisek v. Lamone70 sued the State of Maryland under a
different theory. Instead of arguing that election outcomes proved an injury,
plaintiffs contended that the redrawn district itself contained the necessary
evidence. They argued that by moving thousands of people in and out of the
state’s Sixth District based on citizens’ voting history, the government had
retaliated against citizens’ speech at the ballot box, thus violating First
Amendment freedoms of speech and association. In short, Republican and
Republican-leaning voters of western Maryland had been denied an equal
opportunity to elect a representative.
Gill was argued in the Supreme Court in October 2017 on the merits,
while Benisek reached the Supreme Court via interlocutory appeal71 and was
argued in March 2018. Both cases were decided in June 2018. In Benisek,
the Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of the injunction in a short per
curiam opinion avoiding the merits. In Gill, Chief Justice Roberts also
avoided the merits of the case, writing a unanimous opinion vacating the
district court’s judgment in Gill due to a lack of standing.72 But he also took
a step toward defining a justiciable claim.
A. Chief Justice Roberts’s District-by-District Theory: Individual Harms Require
Alternative Maps
Chief Justice Roberts described what “concrete and particularized”
harms must be suffered to make the Wisconsin plaintiffs’ claims justiciable.
He laid out a district-by-district theory focusing on the harms suffered by
individual voters, rather than by groups of voters.73 Rather than accepting
the district court’s finding that standing was satisfied by the dilution of the
plaintiffs’ votes as members of the Wisconsin Democratic Party,74 the Chief
Justice referred to the Reynolds v. Sims75 finding that the right to vote is

70
71
72
73

74
75

At the time of filing, the case was called Shapiro v. McManus. 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015).
Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018).
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1923.
A related doctrine is the right to vote under state constitutions. For an excellent summary of those
provisions, see Joshua Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89 (2014).
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1926.
377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964).
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“individual and personal in nature.”76 By this reasoning, the dilution of a
vote must be analyzed in the context of where it was cast, in a specific,
individual district.77 In analogy to racially-based claims, Roberts noted that
a voter who suffers an unconstitutional racial gerrymander can be provided
relief by courts without redrawing the state’s entire map.78 Thus, he
concluded, claims of party-based vote-dilution claims must be concrete and
particularized enough to meet Article III standing.
1. A Single-District Approach for Partisan Harm is Reminiscent of Race-Based
Harms
In the opinion for the Court, the Chief Justice laid out the steps a plaintiff
would need to take to allege a vote-dilution claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. While acknowledging that he had no quarrel with the
mathematics of the efficiency gap and other measures of partisan unfairness,
he noted that such measures “do not address the effect that a gerrymander
has on the votes of particular citizens” but rather measure the overall average
“effect that a gerrymander has on the fortunes of political parties.”79
Chief Justice Roberts further noted that under the plaintiffs’ proposed
alternative districting plans, some plaintiffs would end up in a district with
nearly the same partisan breakdown, meaning that their particular situation
could be explained by natural geography rather than partisan intent.80 He
concluded that the remedy must be “tailored to redress the plaintiff’s
particular injury.”81
This formulation of the district-by-district theory may be synthesized into
the following working checklist for what a plaintiff must prove to win a case
under an Equal Protection, single-district argument:
•
•
•

76
77
78
79
80
81

The plaintiff must live in a district in which their vote could help elect
their candidate of choice;
The district the plaintiff currently lives in is drawn in such a way as to
make the plaintiff’s casting of a ballot futile; and
The current construction of the district is unusual, or is unlikely to have
arisen by chance.

Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1929.
Id. at 1930.
Id. at 1931.
Id. at 1933.
Id.
Id. at 1934 (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 353 (2006)).
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This checklist defines whether a voter has been denied the opportunity to
elect a representative. Conceptually, it is reminiscent of the use of race in
defining whether a minority-group voter has been denied the chance to elect
a representative. This conceptualization of a party-based harm under the
Fourteenth Amendment would require an analysis which considers a state’s
political and physical geography to determine whether a challenged district
is abnormal or unusual.
Demonstration of such a harm requires the drawing of alternative maps.
In her four-vote concurrence, Justice Kagan noted that it would “not be
hard” to prove packing or cracking because a plaintiff could produce an
alternative map to show how the plaintiff’s vote could carry more weight
under a different map.82 While Justice Kagan was correct that a single map
can be valuable evidence, an even more persuasive way to make such a
determination is by creating an ensemble of thousands or even millions of
hypothetical maps, all of which comply with state and federal requirements.
Modern computing can do this with ease. An analyst can then compare the
challenged district to the districts in the ensemble to determine whether the
plaintiff’s situation is typical for the distribution, or an outlier.83
An ensemble-map method was most recently used in the North Carolina
partisan gerrymandering case Common Cause v. Rucho.84 There, the threejudge panel struck down the state’s congressional districting scheme, relying
in part on the expert testimony of Professor Jonathan Mattingly, a
mathematician from Duke University.85 Dr. Mattingly used an algorithm to
draw over 24,000 hypothetical congressional districting plans for North
Carolina. Comparing his ensemble of plans to the challenged plan, Dr.
Mattingly concluded that the challenged plan was unlikely to arise from
chance because over 99% of districting plans in his ensemble elected fewer
82

83

84

85

See id. at 1936 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“In many partisan gerrymandering cases, that threshold
showing will not be hard to make. Among other ways of proving packing or cracking, a plaintiff
could produce an alternative map (or set of alternative maps)—comparably consistent with
traditional districting principles—under which her vote would carry more weight.”).
Indeed, Judge Frank Easterbrook also concluded that such evidence may be permissible to prove
such a constitutional harm. See Gonzalez v. City of Aurora, 535 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating
that plaintiffs could have used ensemble mapmaking to prove their alleged harm, though they did
not in this case).
Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 (M.D.N.C.), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2679, remanded to
318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (requiring further consideration in light of Gill v. Whitford).
Id. at 642.
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Republican members of Congress than the challenged plan did.86 This
analysis can also be used to compare an individual voter’s district-wide
partisan environment with many possible alternative plans, thus turning a
generalized claim of targeting into a concrete demonstration of harm to them
individually.
2. Single-District Harms Add a Requirement for Big Data
In contrast to claims of individual harm based on race, the demonstration
of individual harm based on party requires several kinds of data, including
information that is not collected in the Census. First, the drawing of
alternative maps requires accurate knowledge of voting precinct boundaries.
This is necessary because districts are typically constructed from precincts.
Second, it is necessary to know how each precinct voted, so that the voting
behavior of an alternative district can be estimated. This latter information
comes from election results, unlike race, which comes from the Census.
Precincts are normally constructed of multiple census blocks although there
is no requirement in all states that boundaries be coterminous.
A single-district claim creates a demand for data and computation. This
data is more difficult to acquire than lawyers (and likely, Supreme Court
Justices) appreciate.87 Creating alternative maps requires precinct boundary
data for every election in which they wish to measure partisan performance
of proposed alternative districts. Voting precinct boundaries are not static,
but are frequently changed by state legislatures, by local election
administrators, or by both. This could act as a bar to plaintiffs without the
resources or backing of outside organizations. Efforts are now underway to
make such information available broadly.88
For plaintiffs lacking money or informational resources, prospective
plaintiffs may find it more attractive to demonstrate harms at a statewide
level using simple statistical measures. It should be noted that the Roberts
opinion applies specifically to standing. Indeed, he noted that “we need not
86
87

88

Id. at 643–45.
See Michal Migurski, Open Precinct Data, MEDIUM, Apr. 9, 2018, https://medium.com/
planscore/open-precinct-data-eec479287715.
One example of such an effort is OpenPrecincts.org, an initiative of the Princeton Gerrymandering
Project which seeks to create a national database of precinct boundaries and election results and
develop tools with which to use them. See OPENPRECINCTS, http://openprecincts.org/ (last visited
Oct. 11, 2019).
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doubt the plaintiffs’ math.”89 Once the plaintiffs have established standing,
statistical measures of statewide harms may still be useful. Thus, when
combined with traditional legal evidence like witness testimony and
legislative records, a plaintiff has multiple ways to demonstrate vote dilution.
B. Justice Kagan’s Statewide Harms Theory: Maps and Statistical Tests Are Both
Sufficient
While the theory of vote dilution has long been at the center of voting
rights theories,90 partisan gerrymandering “causes other harms”91 than those
suffered by individual voters. In a four-vote concurrence in Gill v. Whitford,
Justice Kagan states that partisan gerrymanders can “infringe [upon] the
First Amendment rights of association held by parties, other political
organizations, and their members.”92 Rather than measuring the “harm”
for Article III standing purposes by the relative strength of an individual
voter’s ballot, associational harms from gerrymandering could include
increased difficulty in party “fundraising, registering voters, attracting
volunteers, generating support from independents, and recruiting candidates
to run for office.”93 Gerrymanders, says Kagan, weaken a party’s ability to
perform all of these functions because gerrymandering places the state party
at an “enduring electoral disadvantage.”94 Because these harms are suffered
by parties or other groups across district lines, they have no need to prove
district-by-district harm to satisfy the requirements of Article III.
In these cases, standing would be established by (1) proving that the
current plan, as enacted, is a partisan gerrymander; and (2) that the
gerrymander’s deleterious effects on the party or organization diminish the
organization’s ability to advance its goals or recruit others to its fold. As with
district-by-district claims, the former point could be proven via either
alternative maps or an outlier analysis. Indeed, Dr. Mattingly offered this
exact argument in analyzing the makeup of North Carolina’s congressional
89
90

91
92
93
94

Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018).
Indeed, vote-dilution cases have been possible under the Constitution since Gomillion v. Lightfoot
identified a dilution cause of action under the Fifteenth Amendment. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
However, modern dilution claims are frequently based on section 2 of the Voting Rights Act rather
than the Fifteenth Amendment.
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1934 (Kagan, J., concurring).
Id. at 1938.
Id.
Id.
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districts as a whole in the federal partisan gerrymandering case Common Cause
v. Rucho.95
Because the inequities of gerrymandering can manifest themselves in
different ways in different states, there is no single mathematical measure
which courts can apply in all circumstances. Indeed, there are many tests a
court receptive to such claims could use to measure partisan intent.96 These
tests should not be thought of as being numerous to the point of confusion.
Instead, they should be considered as comprising a diverse toolkit, being
applicable to a diversity of situations.
Tests may be categorized into two broad groups: tests of inequality of
opportunity and tests of inequitable outcomes.97 Judges applying a familiar
test of discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect could simply look to
the variety of tests which all measure the same constitutional harm (and
frequently reach the same conclusion about the presence of partisan
gerrymandering) to determine whether discriminatory intent or
discriminatory effect exists. Indeed, the Justices were informed of this
argument by amici in Gill.98
Proving both intent and effects is necessary to satisfy standing under
Justice Kagan’s formulation of standing because plaintiffs must prove an
“enduring electoral disadvantage.”99 For example, when measuring for
inequality of opportunity, measuring for consistent advantage (the meanmedian difference)100 is most accurate in large, closely contested states. But

95
96

97
98

99
100

279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 644 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
Id. at 1933 (citing Brief of Heather K. Gerken et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 27,
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161) (citing Sam Wang, Let Math Save Our
Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2015, https://nytimes.com/2015/12/06/opinion/sunday/letmath-save-our-democracy.html)).
For more on this, see infra Part V.
See Brief for Heather K. Gerken et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 19–21, Gill v.
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161).
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1938.
In large states with parties closely divided in strength, engineering a representational advantage
usually results in a large mean-median difference. Wang et al., An Antidote for Gobbledygook: Organizing
the Judge’s Partisan Gerrymandering Toolkit into Tests of Opportunity and Outcome, 17 ELECTION L.J. 302,
309–10 (2018). Developed by Karl Pearson in 1895, the mean-median difference compares the
average statewide vote captured by each party with the median district (the district that falls in the
middle when they are ranked by one party’s vote share). A map which does not mistreat one party
would have a difference between the mean and median that is close to zero; a map which does

November 2019]

LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY REFORM

225

in states where one party dominates, measures of uniform wins (the chisquared test)101 can identify when a gerrymander has occurred.
III. THE FOUNDATION: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHICH
CAN COMBAT GERRYMANDERING, SORTED INTO THE DISTRICT-BYDISTRICT VS. STATEWIDE FRAMEWORK
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan offer two different paths to
vindicating representational rights in courts. But their ideas are not limited
to federal law. State constitutions protect these same rights, and more.
Federal and state law work together to determine the rules and conduct of
local elections.102 Under this federalist arrangement, the Supreme Court
defers to a state supreme court which bases its opinion solely on issues of state
constitutional law.103 When there are federal and state issues intertwined in
a case, the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine can prevent
the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing the state court’s decision so long as
the opinion rests substantially on state law.104

101

102

103

104

mistreat one party would see its median district tilted strongly toward one party, meaning one party
gained a consistent advantage in the map’s districts.
In large states in which one party dominates the political landscape, the natural distribution of
districts would create a “median” district which strongly favors one party over another. Id. at 309–
10. Thus, analysts substitute in the chi-squared test for the mean-median difference. In these
single-party states, a map drawn without partisan intent would be expected to produce districts for
the dominant party which vary in strength. Some are blowout wins for the party, while others are
carried by narrow margins. A partisan gerrymander in these states would seek to maximize its wins
by making its wins small enough to avoid wasting votes, but large enough to secure its majority for
the next decade. The chi-squared test identifies this artificial uniformity, and the underlying intent,
in ways the other tests cannot.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may
at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.”).
See Donald L. Bell, The Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine: Federalism, Uniformity, Equality
and Individual Liberty, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 365, 365–66 (1988); see also Robert Barnes, Supreme Court
Refuses to Stop New Congressional Maps in Pennsylvania, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-refuses-to-stop-new-congr
essional-maps-in-pennsylvania/2018/03/19/128d9656-215e-11e8-badd-7c9f29a55815_story.ht
ml.
See Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article III and the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 48 AM. U.
L. REV. 1053, 1053–54 (1999) (“The United States Supreme Court has constitutional and statutory
authority to review the final judgments of state courts in cases involving federal questions. Under
the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine . . . , however, the Supreme Court will not
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Because state supreme courts are the final authority for interpreting their
own states’ constitutions, similarly worded provisions across different states
can have extremely varied interpretations. Some courts interpret their
constitutional protections of freedom of speech, association, and equal
protection in lockstep with their federal analogues. In these cases, state
supreme court rulings depend on federal interpretations, and the Supreme
Court may review those decisions. Other states can give their constitutional
provisions their own independent meaning, affording greater protections
than the Federal Constitution.105 In these latter cases, state supreme courts
have the option of looking to intellectual arguments laid out by Justices
Roberts and Kagan in Gill, whether or not those arguments are eventually
used to make federal law. Both Roberts’ district-by-district theory and Justice
Kagan’s statewide theory can easily be applied to protections anchored in
state law. In short, as the final arbiters of their founding documents, state
courts are free to strike down unfair districting schemes.106 We will next show
that state courts have a longstanding tradition of doing so.

105

106

review a . . . final opinion on state law that is independent of the federal issues and adequate to
support the judgment. In other words, if the Supreme Court’s opinion on the federal issues would
not change the outcome of the case because the judgment rests on unreviewable state law, the
Supreme Court will not review the federal issues in the case.”) (internal citations omitted).
However, the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine is not the total bar that avoiding
federal issues altogether is, because the Supreme Court may review the case to determine if there
are “adequate and independent” grounds for the state court’s opinion. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1983) (holding that the Supreme Court did not lack jurisdiction to decide a
case on the asserted ground that the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court rested on adequate
and independent state grounds). Thus, while including federal issues in a complaint may
nevertheless avoid federal review if a state court bases its ultimate opinion on adequate and
independent state grounds, it is more advantageous for the plaintiffs to base their claim solely on
state law grounds if they wish to preserve immunity from federal review.
Rather than provide guidance on how each state’s courts have historically interpreted these
decisions in the gerrymandering context (if they have at all) ourselves, we confine our analysis to a
discussion of constitutional guarantees. Litigators can apply their knowledge of their individual
states to determine historical interpretations of each pertinent provision, and, if necessary, develop
the arguments necessary to persuade a state court to adopt the arguments articulated therein.
While we do not warrant that we have found every case throughout American history to strike
down a redistricting plan under state constitutional law, any further cases found by resourceful
researchers would only reinforce the core thesis of this Part: that state courts have a long and rich
history of protecting representational rights by striking down districting schemes for violating their
respective constitutions.
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A. State Constitutional Protections Against District-by-District Partisanships
By defining partisan vote dilution as an infringement on an individual’s
right to vote, Chief Justice Roberts defined a theory focused on individual
liberties. State constitutions contain three protections which plaintiffs could
bring on a district-by-district basis: (1) Equal Protection; (2) Due Process;
and (3) Prohibitions on Uniform or Special Laws. While some states have
interpreted these provisions to mirror the Federal Constitution, they are not
bound to do so in the future. Conversely, many states offer greater
protections than those afforded by the Federal Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment. In this respect, state and federal law can be seen as
complementary and equal partners in protecting voting rights.
1. Equal Protection/Due Process
All fifty state constitutions contain provisions guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws, due process of law, or a similar provision107 which
state courts have interpreted to be analogous.108 While it is most common to
make a direct analogy to constitutional protections, several states, including
Alaska and California, interpret their provisions more broadly than the
federal Equal Protection Clause. In Hickel v. Southeast Conference,109 the Alaska
Supreme Court applied the state’s Equal Protection Clause to the recently
enacted legislative districting plan and struck parts of it down by stating:
“In the context of voting rights in redistricting and reapportionment
litigation, there are two principles of equal protection, namely that of ‘one
person, one vote’—the right to an equally weighted vote—and of ‘fair and
effective representation’—the right to group effectiveness or an equally
powerful vote.” The former is quantitative, or purely numerical, in nature;
the latter is qualitative.
The equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution has been
interpreted along lines which resemble but do not precisely parallel the
interpretation given the federal clause. While the first part, “one person, one
107

108
109

While this Article focuses on the way state courts give these general provisions broad meaning,
potentially encapsulating a future partisan gerrymandering challenge, they have been used in ways
similar to the Federal Constitution to find racial and equipopulation harms in redistricting. See, e.g.,
In re S. J. Res. of Legis. Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 618 (Fla. 2012); infra Appendix A
(column on state provisions guaranteeing equal population among its legislative or congressional
districts).
See Appendix A, infra, for a table containing all fifty constitutional provisions.
846 P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska 1992).
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vote,” has mirrored the federal requirement, the second part, “fair and
effective representation,” has been interpreted more strictly than the
analogous federal provision.110

Several other state courts have also taken a more expansive view of the
equal protection concept than their federal analogues in other contexts. The
country’s most influential state court, the Supreme Court of California,111
has held that its Equal Protection Clause has “independent vitality” which
can guarantee greater protections than those afforded by the federal
clause.112 The Idaho Supreme Court has held that its constitution “stands
on its own, and although we may look to the rulings of the federal courts on
the United States Constitution for guidance in interpreting our own state
constitutional guarantees, we interpret a separate and in many respects
independent constitution.”113 The Supreme Court of Illinois notes that,
while it looks for “guidance and inspiration” from the federal courts “in
interpreting our State constitution, we make the final determination.”114
And the Michigan Supreme Court has held that it has a “constitutional duty”
to independently interpret the Michigan Constitution.115
In short, guarantees of equal protection and due process are present in
every state constitution, and are nearly universally applied to laws passed by
their state legislatures. The examples of the Alaska, Idaho, California, and
110

111

112

113
114
115

Hickel, 846 P.2d at 47 (quoting Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1366 (Alaska
1987)) (citing Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863 (Alaska 1974)) (clarifying the meanings of “one person,
one vote” and “fair and effective representation”) (internal citations omitted).
See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric Posner, Which States Have the Best (and Worst) High Courts?
1–2 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 405, 2008) (ranking the
Supreme Court of California as the court whose majority opinions are cited most frequently by outof-state state courts).
See Assembly v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939, 960 (Cal. 1982) (“Since [Legislature v. Reinecke, 492
P.2d 385 (Cal. 1972) (in bank)], this court has also held that our state’s equal protection clause,
adopted in 1974, has ‘independent vitality’ which at times may require greater protection than that
afforded by the federal Constitution.”) (internal citations removed).
Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 682 P.2d 539, 543 (Idaho 1984).
People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 588 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (Ill. 1991).
See In re Request for Advisory Op. Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444,
496 (Mich. 2007) (“When interpreting our constitution, therefore, ‘[t]he right question is not
whether [the] state’s guarantee is the same as or broader than its federal counterpart as interpreted
by the [United States] Supreme Court. The right question is what the state’s guarantee means and
how it applies to the case at hand.’ And though the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Federal Constitution may be a polestar to help us navigate to the correct interpretation of
our constitution, it is no more than that. Ultimately, it is our constitutional duty to independently
interpret the Michigan Constitution.”) (internal citations omitted).
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Illinois Supreme Courts show that in states dominated by either major party,
courts are not afraid to wield those provisions against laws that threaten the
liberty of their citizens. Combined with the equal protection argument laid
out by Chief Justice Roberts, these guarantees offer an intuitive and
straightforward rationale for litigation against partisan gerrymanders.
2. Prohibitions on Special or Local Laws
Thirty-four states116 prohibit the passage of special or local laws. These
prohibitions have most often been construed to mirror federal equal
protection guidelines, frequently applying rational-basis review to such
laws.117 But several states have interpreted the prohibition more strictly,
applying heightened scrutiny under the theory that these laws violate the
rights of individuals to be treated equally under the law.
Of particular interest are California, Georgia, Kentucky, and Ohio. The
California Supreme Court applies heightened scrutiny to all cases in which
the plaintiff is a member of a suspect class.118 The Supreme Court of Georgia
applies a variable standard of scrutiny depending on the status of the plaintiff,
but the standard falls above rational basis.119 The Kentucky Supreme Court,
meanwhile, applies a standard slightly higher than rational basis,120 as does
the Ohio Supreme Court.121
State courts in North Dakota,122

116
117

118
119

120

121

122

See infra Appendix B.
Courts applying rational basis review will uphold a statute or regulation if it is rationally related to
a legitimate governmental interest. See Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review,
102 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1629 (2016) (discussing rational basis review).
See In re Mary G., 151 Cal. App. 4th. 184, 198–99 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
Dev. Auth. v. State, 684 S.E.2d 856, 859 (Ga. 2009) (holding that the state constitution’s
requirement of uniform operation of general laws requires “alike operation” on all persons who
come under its scope).
See Parker v. Webster Cty. Coal, LLC (Dotiki Mine), 529 S.W.3d 759, 770 (Ky. 2017) (holding that
legislation is unconstitutional special law when it arbitrarily or beyond reasonable justification
discriminates against some persons or objects and favors others).
See State ex rel. Zupancic v. Limbach, 568 N.E.2d 1206, 1211–12 (Ohio 1991) (holding that a
statute is constitutional under Ohio’s prohibition on special laws if it achieves a legitimate
governmental interest and operates equally on all persons or entities or persons included within its
provisions).
See State v. Hamilton, 129 N.W. 916, 918 (N.D. 1910) (holding that a law for the nomination of
candidates for office which required different levels of support in different counties in the state was
unconstitutionally non-uniform).
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Pennsylvania,123 and Kansas124 have used the provisions in the past to strike
down statutes relating to elections or education that treated classes of persons
differently.
These prohibitions on local or special laws are helpful to plaintiffs
bringing vote-dilution claims because they are conceptually independent of
the Federal Constitution. Without a direct federal analog, a state court may
feel freer to depart from U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of equal
protection and establish its own, independent standards. This raises the
possibility that these provisions, rather than due process or equal protection
analogs, may offer plaintiffs hope to bring a district-by-district claim using
Justice Roberts’ theory, even if a Fourteenth Amendment-based claim is
someday found to be non-justiciable.
B. Finding Proscriptions Against Partisanship in Statewide-Harm Constitutional
Provisions
State constitutional protections are not limited to the district-by-district
framework envisioned by Chief Justice Roberts. Claims can also be
grounded in the rights of free speech and association, as well as mandates
that elections be free, equal, or pure.
1. Freedom of Speech/Expression/Association (Retaliation Theory)
All fifty state constitutions protect the freedom of speech in various ways.
The most common structure is exemplified by Alabama, which protects the
“liberty of speech or of the press” and permits any person to “speak, write,
and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty.”125 Some states go further rhetorically: North Carolina’s
Constitution says that “[f]reedom of speech and of the press are two of the
123

124

125

See Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556, 573 (Pa. 1964) (“[A] legislative scheme which creates singlemember districts and multi-member districts in an arbitrary manner would be objectionable. . . .
[I]n the absence of any reasonable explanation or justification (historical or otherwise), such
districting might be the result of gerrymandering for partisan advantage and, in that event, would
be arbitrary and capricious.”).
State ex rel. Jackson v. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 34 P.2d 102, 103 (Kan. 1934) (holding that a statute
detaching land from one school district and attaching it to another was an unconstitutional attempt
to delegate legislative power to certain landowners, making the law a special law).
ALA. CONST. § 4; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a) (“Every person may freely speak, write, and
publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law
may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”).
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great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained, but every
person shall be held responsible for their abuse.”126 Furthermore, forty-seven
state constitutions guarantee freedom of association, the exceptions being
Maryland, Minnesota, and New Mexico.127
The U.S. Supreme Court has used the First Amendment’s speech
protections to strike down election laws.128 This is particularly true in the
realm of campaign finance. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,129
the Court struck down the prohibition in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BCRA) which prohibited corporations and labor unions from
making independent expenditures in federal elections. Holding that prior
precedents of the Court finding a right to restrict corporate spending in
politics to prevent distortions in electoral discourse interfered with the open
marketplace of ideas protected by the First Amendment, the Supreme Court
overruled the line of cases as unconstitutional.130 The Court extended this
logic to strike down aggregate contribution limits in 2014,131 leaving
contribution limits to individual campaigns and bans on soft money as the
only remaining restriction of BCRA.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet extended First Amendmentbased reasoning to redistricting, Justice Anthony Kennedy first discerned
such a route in his concurrence in Vieth v. Jubelirer.132 He wrote that targeting
the placement of voters in districts based on partisanship to reduce their
power was a form of viewpoint discrimination.133 Justice Kagan furthered

126
127

128

129
130

131
132
133

N.C. CONST. art I, § 14.
Rather than reading a “freedom of association” into another constitutional provision, such as
substantive due process, all three states’ highest courts have largely applied the Supreme Court’s
incorporation doctrine of the First Amendment against the states when doing an association
analysis.
Notably, the Court has also used the First Amendment to abolish government censorship in other
areas, even in gruesome areas such as pornographic depictions of animal cruelty, so-called “crush
videos.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (declaring statute criminalizing the depiction
of animal cruelty unconstitutional prohibition on free speech).
558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010).
Id. at 354 (“Austin interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First
Amendment.”).
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014).
541 U.S. 267 (1994).
Id. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“First Amendment concerns arise when a State enacts a law
that has the purpose and effect of subjecting a group of voters or their party to disfavored treatment
by reason of their views. In the context of partisan gerrymandering, that means that First
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this theory in her own concurrence in Gill v. Whitford.134 The Supreme Court
declined to use this reasoning in 2019 in two cases: Benisek v. Lamone and
Rucho v. Common Cause.135 Nonetheless, state supreme courts may still use
Justice Kagan’s concurrence as guidance for how to pursue their claims
under state constitution-based protections of viewpoint and association.
Historically, most state courts which have struck down election laws as
violations of Free Speech protections have modeled, if not entirely followed,
the U.S. Supreme Court’s doctrinal lead by focusing on campaign finance
regulations. Foreshadowing the Roberts Court’s approach, in 2000, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska struck down an independent expenditure law as
an infringement on free speech under the state constitution’s Free Speech
Clause.136 Some state supreme courts have resisted non-retaliation
arguments under a Freedom of Speech argument, instead reframing quasivote-dilution cases using Equal Protection arguments.137 However, with
insights of Justice Kagan’s concurrence available to them, state courts may
be more receptive to a retaliation argument under First Amendment
analogues in future litigation.
2. Free and Equal/Purity of Elections Clauses
We now turn to a state constitutional provision which lacks a counterpart
in the Federal Constitution: a mandate that elections be some combination

134
135
136

137

Amendment concerns arise where an apportionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a
group of voters’ representational rights.”).
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring).
These two cases were consolidated in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
State ex rel. Steinberg v. Moore, 605 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Neb. 2000) (“Based upon our independent
review, we determine that § 14, as codified at § 32-1614, unconstitutionally infringes upon the right
of groups and committees to engage in political speech through the making of independent
expenditures as defined by Nebraska law.”).
See Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 601, 629 (Md. 1993) (“Skinner and Weiner claim
that the population disparities among the legislative districts in the Governor’s plan also violate
their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. They argue that by assigning them fewer
representatives per resident than other areas, the Governor’s plan dilutes their vote and hence their
‘political expression’ relative to other Maryland citizens. The Special Master rejected this assertion
‘as simply another way of framing the contentions under the 14th Amendment’ with regard to
population equality. The Special Master was right”). While the quoted language relates to the
Court of Appeals of Maryland (Maryland’s highest court) analyzing the Federal Constitution, it is
likely that the Court’s interpretation would be similar under its own state constitution because it
could have found for Skinner and Weiner under the state’s guarantees, but elected not to do so.
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of free, equal, or pure. Twenty-eight state constitutions have provisions
calling for elections to be “free and equal,” “free and fair,” or meet some
other similar standard like “purity.” For example, Arkansas’s Constitution
similarly guarantees that “[e]lections shall be free and equal. No power, civil
or military, shall ever interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of
suffrage.”138 Vermont’s Constitution goes even further, noting that elections
“ought to be free and without corruption.”139 And Colorado’s Constitution
mandates purity in its elections: “The general assembly [sic] shall pass laws
to secure the purity of elections, and guard against abuses of the elective
franchise.”140 These provisions date back to the earliest days of the United
States, appearing in the constitutions or bills or declarations of rights of
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Virginia in 1776; Vermont in 1777;
Massachusetts in 1780; New Hampshire in 1784; and Kentucky and
Maryland in 1792.
In early 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on such a
provision in its own Constitution to strike down the state’s congressional
map. In League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth,141 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that under Article I, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
which mandates that elections “shall be free and equal,” laws placing voters
into individual districts must “make their votes equally potent”142 in their
ultimate elections for congressional representatives:
[O]ur Commonwealth’s commitment to neutralizing factors which unfairly
impede or dilute individuals’ rights to select their representatives was borne
of our forebears’ bitter personal experience suffering the pernicious effects
resulting from previous electoral schemes that sanctioned such
discrimination. Furthermore, adoption of a broad interpretation guards
against the risk of unfairly rendering votes nugatory, artificially entrenching
representative power, and discouraging voters from participating in the
electoral process because they have come to believe that the power of their
individual vote has been diminished to the point that it “does not count.” A
broad and robust interpretation of Article I, Section 5 serves as a bulwark
against the adverse consequences of partisan gerrymandering.143

138
139
140
141
142
143

ARK. CONST. art. III, § 2.
VT. CONST. ch. I, art. VIII.
COLO. CONST. art VII, § 11.
178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018).
Id. at 792–93 (Pa. 2018) (quoting Patterson v. Barlow, 60 Pa. 54, 75 (1869) (upholding a poll tax
against claims that it violated the “free and equal” clause)); id. at 814.
Id.

234

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:1

The decision relied solely on the “free and equal” provision, but also
invoked protections in the Pennsylvania Constitution of free speech, freedom
of assembly, equal protection, compactness, contiguity, and respect for the
integrity of political subdivisions in support of it.144
However, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately
described the harm they found as “vote dilution,” it was not the same vote
dilution contemplated in Gill by Chief Justice Roberts. Instead, it was the
vote dilution to an individual voter, which necessarily implicates the votes of
other voters, requiring wholesale changes to the map as a remedy.145
Pennsylvania’s and North Carolina’s state courts are not the only ones
to use the guarantees of free, equal, or pure elections to strike down electionrelated laws. Over a century ago, the Colorado Supreme Court held that
the connivance of private corporations with county officials to create voting
precincts controlled by corporations to the exclusion of the people violated
the state’s guarantee to all citizens of “the free exercise of the right of
suffrage.”146 And in 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that its
constitution’s guarantee of “free and equal” elections was implicated when
ballot machines did not properly count ballots.147 Judicial interpretations of
144
145
146

147

Id.
Id. at 804–14.
Neelley v. Farr, 158 P. 458, 466–68 (Colo. 1916) (“These companies plainly connived with certain
county officials to secure the creation of election precincts, bounded so as to include their private
property only, and with lines marked by their own fences, or guarded by their own armed men,
and within which were only their own employés. They excluded the public from entrance to such
election precincts, labeled the same as private property, and warned the public that entrance
thereon constituted trespass. They denied the right of free public assemblage within such election
precincts, and likewise the right of free or open discussion of public questions therein. They denied
the right to circulate election literature or the distribution of the cards of candidates within such
precincts. They secured the selection of their own employés exclusively as judges and clerks of
election, and by the location of precinct boundaries no other than their employees could so serve.
They apparently made the registration lists from their pay rolls. They kept such lists in their private
places of business and in charge of their employés. They prohibited all public investigation within
such election precincts as to the qualification of the persons so registered as electors of the precinct.
Through their employés acting as election officials they assisted numerous non English-speaking
persons to vote by marking their ballots for them, in plain violation of the law. They provided other
non English-speaking persons with the fraudulent device heretofore described, by which such
persons might be enabled to vote the Republican ticket without being able to read either the name
of the candidate or the party ticket for which they so voted. They coerced and intimidated their
employés in many instances.”).
See Chavez v. Brewer, 214 P.3d 397, 408 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the plaintiffs had stated
a valid cause of action under the state constitution’s “free and equal” provision based on voting
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a “pure” election are less common, but they typically center on issues where
some event has occurred which throws the election’s result into doubt. In
the partisan gerrymandering context, an argument could be made that the
votes of a targeted group could be so diluted as to render the legitimacy of
an election in doubt. These examples, as well as others, provide a rich history
of case law which plaintiffs in various states can rely on to expand the
doctrine governing partisan gerrymandering.
A few state constitutions are even more explicit in their calls for equitable
representation, providing explicitly for “equal representation” or “an equal
right to elect” state officials. These provisions could be interpreted as
implying that each vote should have an equal effect in determining
representation.148 Such provisions are found in several states with no
mechanism for enacting independent redistricting commissions, such as
North Dakota (“The legislative assembly shall guarantee, as nearly as
practicable, that every elector is equal to every other elector in the state in
the power to cast ballots for legislative candidates”),149 South Carolina (“All
elections shall be free and open, and every inhabitant of this State possessing
the qualifications provided for in this Constitution shall have an equal right
to elect officers and be elected to fill public office”),150 and West Virginia
(“Every citizen shall be entitled to equal representation in the government,
and, in all apportionments of representation, equality of numbers of those
entitled thereto, shall as far as practicable, be preserved”).151 The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has already used this language to strike
down laws electing delegates to a state constitutional convention on
malapportionment grounds.152
Eleven states require that elections be “pure.” Vermont calls for elections
to be “free and pure,”153 while Illinois requires that the legislature “insure . . .

148

149
150
151
152
153

machines not counting ballots properly); see also Gunaji v. Macias, 31 P.3d 1008, 1013 (N.M. 2001)
(discussing the New Mexico Constitution’s “free and open” elections clause).
See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. IX (“[T]he inhabitants of this commonwealth . . . have an equal
right to elect officers, and to be elected, for public employments.”); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XI
(“[E]very inhabitant of the state of 18 years of age and upwards shall have an equal right to vote in
any election.”).
N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 5.
W. VA. CONST. art. II, § 4.
See State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 143 S.E.2d 791, 794–95 (W. Va. 1965).
VT. CONST. ch. I, art. VIII.
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the integrity of the election process.”154 Michigan’s Constitution mandates
that the Legislature “enact laws . . . [to] preserve the purity of elections.”155
Michigan’s Supreme Court interpreted this clause to mean that “any law
enacted by the Legislature which adversely affects the purity of elections is
constitutionally infirm,” defining “purity of elections” as requiring “fairness
and evenhandedness in the election laws.”156 Tennessee’s Constitution gives
the General Assembly discretion on whether to enact laws securing “the
freedom of elections and the purity of the ballot box.”157 A multitude of cases
have construed the applicability of purity constitutional provisions to
individual voting rights such as voter identification and ballots.158
To apply the free-and-equal and purity provisions of state constitutions
to block excessively partisan redistricting, the next step would be identifying
indicia of an offense. Such evidence would include single-party control of
redistricting, as well as patterns of behavior such as the active exclusion of
the opposing major political party in the redistricting process. Mathematical
evidence could come from a wide variety of tests which can be sorted into
two categories: violations of the opportunity to elect representatives, and
inequitable outcomes.159
To summarize, guarantees of free, equal, and elections have a rich history
in American jurisprudence. They have been used to strike down unfair or
biased election laws for more than a century. The recent example set by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court shows how such a route may be used to
regulate extreme partisan gerrymanders.
C. Regulations on Partisanship in Districting & Competitiveness
Some states have adopted constitutional provisions which regulate the
partisan outcomes in drawing district lines. These fall into two categories:
(1) prohibitions on district lines favoring parties or persons, whether unduly
or explicitly; and (2) requirements that districts be competitive.
154
155
156

157
158
159

ILL. CONST. art. III, § 4.
MICH. CONST. art. II, § 4(2).
McDonald v. Grand Traverse Cty. Election Comm’n, 662 N.W.2d 804, 816–17 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003) (quoting Socialist Workers Party v. Sec’y of State, 317 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Mich. 1982)) (quoting
Wells v. Kent Cty. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 168 N.W.2d 222, 227 (Mich. 1969)); see also Elliott v.
Sec’y of State, 294 N.W. 171, 173 (Mich. 1940).
TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
See infra Appendices A, B.
See, e.g., Samuel S.-H. Wang et al., An Antidote to Gobbledygook: Organizing the Judge’s Partisan
Gerrymandering Toolkit into Tests of Opportunity and Outcome, 17 ELECTION L.J. 302, 305 (2018).
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1. Prohibitions on Redistricting to Protect a Party or Person
Sixteen states have adopted reforms explicitly aimed at eliminating
partisan gerrymandering. They have inserted language into their state
constitutions or enacted statutes prohibiting the construction of districts to
either favor or disfavor a political party, incumbent, or candidate. Other
states have prohibited the use of political data altogether, except where
necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act. These tools are potentially
effective at attacking gerrymanders, subject to interpretation by their state
supreme courts.160 And because these provisions directly attack partisan
gerrymanders,161 they will obviously be cited in states which contain them.162
160

161

162

Because stare decisis is not an absolute constraint on courts of last resort, state supreme courts which
have in the past interpreted constitutional prohibitions on partisan gerrymandering or traditional
districting principles strictly may nevertheless change course in later decades. For an example of
such vacillation on proper redistricting standards, see the varying interpretations of the Maryland
Court of Appeals regarding the State’s compactness metric. Compare In re 2012 Legislative
Districting of the State, 80 A.3d 1073, 1082 (Md. 2012) (“These challengers, as do all challengers
to a legislative reapportionment plan, carry the burden of demonstrating the law’s invalidity. Once,
however, a proper challenge under Art. III, Sec. 4 is made and is supported by ‘compelling
evidence,’ the State has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to show that the districts are
contiguous and compact, and that due regard was given to natural and political subdivision
boundaries.”) with In re Legislative Districting, 805 A.2d 292, 326 (Md. 2002) (“[I]f in the exercise
of discretion, political considerations and judgments result in a plan in which districts: are noncontiguous; are not compact; with substantially unequal populations; or with district lines that
unnecessarily cross natural or political subdivision boundaries, the plan cannot be sustained. That
a plan may have been the result of discretion, exercised by the one entrusted with the responsibility
of generating the plan, will not save it. The constitution ‘trumps’ political considerations. Politics
or non-constitutional considerations never ‘trump’ constitutional requirements.”) and Legislative
Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646, 654 (Md. 1993) (“[Districts may assume] an unusual shape in
order to comply with the various other legal requirements for districts, such as population equality
and due regard for political boundaries.”).
See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detner, 172 So.2d 363, 370–75 (Fla. 2015) (“These
‘express new standards’ thus afford Florida citizens ‘explicit constitutional protection’ under article
III, section 20, of the Florida Constitution, ‘against partisan political gerrymandering.’”).
The states which contain some variation on this provision in either their statutes or constitutions
(and thus, the only states where this provision is pertinent) are Arizona, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Utah and
Washington. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. II, § 1(15) (“Party registration and voting history data
shall be excluded from the initial phase of the mapping process but may be used to test maps for
compliance with the above goals. The places of residence of incumbents or candidates shall not be
identified or considered.”); CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(e) (“The place of residence of any incumbent
or political candidate shall not be considered in the creation of a map. Districts shall not be drawn
for the purpose of favoring or discriminating against an incumbent, political candidate, or political
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Outside of those states, these provisions offer little to prospective plaintiffs,

party.”); COLO. CONST. art. V, §§ 44.3(4)(a) & 48.1(4)(a) (“No map may be approved by the
commission or given effect by the supreme court if: (a) it has been drawn for the purpose of
protecting one or more incumbent members, or one or more declared candidates, of the [united
states house of representatives/senate or house of representatives], or any political party . . . .”);
DEL. CONST. art. II § 2A (“Redistricting and reapportionment . . . shall be accomplished in
accordance with the following criteria: each new Representative District shall, insofar as is possible
. . . shall not be so created as to unduly favor any person or political party.”); FLA. CONST. art. III,
§§ 20, 21 (“In establishing congressional district boundaries . . . no apportionment plan or individual
district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent”; “In
establishing legislative district boundaries . . . no apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with
the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent . . . .”); HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6(2)
(“No district shall be so drawn as to unduly favor a person or political faction.”); MICH. CONST.
art. IV, § 6(13) (“[C]ommunities of interest do not include relationships with political parties,
incumbents, or political candidates. Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any
political party. A disproportionate advantage shall be determined using accepted measures of
partisan fairness. Districts shall not favor or disfavor an incumbent elected official or a candidate.”);
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4(c)(5) (“Districts shall not be drawn . . . for the purpose of favoring or
disfavoring incumbents or other particular candidates or political parties.”); OHIO CONST. art. XI,
§ 6(A) (“No General Assembly plan shall be drawn primarily to favor or disfavor a political party.”);
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(5)(“The commission’s plan shall not be drawn purposely to favor or
discriminate against any political party or group.”); Idaho Stat. Code 72-1506(8) (“Counties shall
not be divided to protect a particular political party or a particular incumbent.”); Iowa Code §
42.4(5) (“No district shall be drawn for the purpose of favoring a political party, incumbent legislator
or member of Congress, or other person or group . . . . In establishing districts, no use shall be made
of any of the following data: (1) Addresses of incumbent legislators or members of Congress. (2)
Political affiliations of registered voters. (3) Previous election results.”); Mt. Code Ann. 5-1-115(3)
(“A district may not be drawn for the purposes of favoring a political party or an incumbent
legislator or member of congress. The following data or information may not be considered in the
development of a plan: (a) addresses of incumbent legislators or members of congress; (b) political
affiliations of registered voters; (c) partisan political voter lists; or (d) previous election results, unless
required as a remedy by a court.”). Oregon Rev. Stat. 188.010 (“The Legislative Assembly or the
Secretary of State, whichever is applicable, shall consider the following criteria when apportioning
the state into congressional and legislative districts: . . . (2) No district shall be drawn for the purpose
of favoring any political party, incumbent legislator or other person.”); Utah Code Ann. 20A-19103(3) (“The Legislature and Commission may not divide districts in a manner that purposefully or
unduly favors or disfavors any incumbent elected official, candidate, or prospective candidate for
elective office, or any political party.”). Missouri uses a slightly different provision; instead of a
negative provision like the prohibitions above, it uses a positive provision mandating partisan
fairness in the construction of districts. See MO. CONST. art. III, § 3(c)(1)(b) (“Districts shall be
designed in a manner that achieves both partisan fairness and, secondarily, competitiveness.
Partisan fairness means that parties shall be able to translate their popular support into legislative
representation with approximately equal efficiency.”). It should be noted that the majority of states
with these provisions also use redistricting commissions, of some form, to redraw district lines.
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although some state supreme courts have been willing to entertain common
law prohibitions on partisan gerrymandering in unique circumstances.163
2. Competitiveness/Proportional Representation
Four states, Arizona,164 Colorado,165 Missouri,166 and Washington167,
have laws which specifically call for creating competitive districts. Ohio
requires a different concept, proportional representation.168
These
provisions can combat gerrymandering by making districting plans strive for
competition in districts, or satisfy some type of distribution of seats depending
on a state’s two-party vote share. As with prohibitions on partisan
gerrymandering or the use of political data, these provisions place a direct
constraint on how districts may be constructed from a partisan standpoint.

163

164

165

166

167

168

See, e.g., Peterson v. Borst, 786 N.E.2d 668, 669–71 (Ind. 2003) (per curiam) (“[W]e conclude that
the Superior Court’s adoption of a plan that has been uniformly supported by one major political
party and uniformly opposed by the other is incompatible with applicable principles of both the
appearance and fact of judicial independence and neutrality. Because of the emergency nature of
this appeal, we adopt a plan that we have drawn with the consideration of only factors required by
applicable federal and State law, and without consideration of party affiliation or incumbency.”);
see also Burling v. Chandler, 804 A.2d 471, 486 (N.H. 2002) (reapportioning districts to uphold “the
fundamental democratic principle of one person/one vote”).
AZ. CONST. art. IV, pt II, § 1(14)F (“To the extent practicable, competitive districts should be
favored where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other goals”).
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 44.3(3)(a) & (d) and § 48.1(3)(“(a) Thereafter, the commission shall, to the
extent possible, maximize the number of politically competitive districts. . . . For purposes of this
subsection, ‘competitive’ means having a reasonable potential for the party affiliation of the district’s
representative to change at least once between federal decennial censuses. Competitiveness may
be measured by factors such as a proposed district’s past election results, a proposed district’s
political party registration data, and evidence-based analyses of proposed districts.”).
MO. CONST. art III, § 3(c)(1)(b) (“Districts shall be designed in a manner that achieves both partisan
fairness and, secondarily, competitiveness. Partisan fairness means that parties shall be able to
translate their popular support into legislative representation with approximately equal efficiency.
Competitiveness means that parties’ legislative representation shall be substantially and similarly
responsive to shifts in the electorate’s preferences.”).
Wash. Rev. Stat. 44.05.090(5) (“The commission shall exercise its powers to provide fair and
effective representation and to encourage electoral competition.”).
OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 6(B) (“The statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on
statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor each
political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio.”).
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D. Other Arguments: District-by-District Constitutional Provisions
All of the provisions discussed to this point have addressed how state
constitutional provisions may protect more general rights of fairness in
redistricting. But plaintiffs should also consider more explicit constitutional
mandates with which districting plans must comply. For example, cases
relying on compactness can often be seen as a proxy for preventing
gerrymandering,169 and other traditional criteria like contiguity and
preserving pre-existing political boundaries contain a rich jurisprudence of
striking down districting plans.170 By pegging their broader arguments about
vote dilution and mistreatment of voters to these more tried and true
provisions, plaintiffs can give courts a safe path of precedent.
1. Compactness
Thirty-three states require that state legislative districts, congressional
districts, or both be compact, either constitutionally or by statute.
Compactness has several dozen legally accepted meanings, some based
purely on geometric shape and some on population patterns. Courts’
struggles with defining compactness have led some state courts to conclude
that legislatures themselves get to decide whether a district is compact,
effectively neutering the provision altogether.171 But some state courts see
compactness provisions in their intended light, as a check on the power of
the legislature. From this conclusion, it necessarily follows that the courts,
not legislatures, should determine which definitions of compactness to use
when evaluating such claims.172 Missouri’s Constitution states: “In general,
compact districts are those which are square, rectangular, or hexagonal in

169

170

171

172

See, e.g., Micah Altman, Modeling the Effect of Mandatory District Compactness on Partisan Gerrymanders, 17
POL. GEOGRAPHY 989 (1998); Richard Niemi, Bernard Grofman, Carl Carlucci, and Thomas
Hofeller, Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compactness Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial
Gerrymandering, 52 J. POL. 1155 (1990).
Because these three criteria are considered to be “traditional,” the Supreme Court has held that
they are the only permissible reasons for which a state may depart from the one person, one vote
requirement.
See Vesilind v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 813 S.E.2d 739 (Va. 2018) (“(S)ocial scientists have
developed at least 50 different methods of measuring compactness.”).
See, e.g., In re 2001 Redistricting Cases, 44 P.3d 141 (Alaska 2002); Hall v. Moreno, 270 P.3d 961
(Colo. 2012); In re S. J. Res. Of Leg. Apportionment 1176, 83 So.3d 597 (Fla. 2012).
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shape to the extent permitted by natural or political boundaries.”173 Missouri
has used this compactness requirement as an explicit check on partisan
gerrymandering.174
2. Contiguity
Along with compactness, contiguity is one of the oldest redistricting
requirements. Forty-two state constitutions require that districts be
contiguous, and all fifty states require it in some form (statute, constitution,
or judicial precedent).175 Although a few cases have overturned redistricting
plans based on the contiguity requirement, many have “stretched” the
provision to include rivers, highways, mountain ranges, or even two corners
meeting in a single point.176 While contiguity is a fairly weak requirement, it
does prevent the packing of voters into isolated islands based on their voting
173
174

175

176

MO. CONST., art. III, § 3(c)(1)(e).
See State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 146 S.W. 40, 65 (Mo. 1912) (“There, as here, the evident
intention of the people of the state, as manifested in said constitutional provisions, is that, when
counties are combined to form a district, they must not only touch each other, but they must be
closely united territory, and thereby guard, as far as practicable, the system of representation
adopted in the state against the legislative evil commonly known as the ‘gerrymander.’ In a
republican form of government, each citizen should have an equal voice in the enactment of the
laws, their interpretation, and execution. This is the true spirit and meaning of our Constitution
and laws, and the judge upon the bench, in construing and giving them effect, should put aside
party feeling and be governed solely by the spirit of the old proverbial saying, ‘Tros Tyriusque mihi
nullo discrimine agetur.’ Inequality of representation in a republican form of government is just as
offensive and unjust as is taxation without representation. Both are repugnant to and inconsistent
with the American idea of government and true citizenship.”).
See Redistricting Criteria, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
redistricting/redistricting-criteria.aspx (last updated Apr. 23, 2019); see also infra Appendix A.
See In re Apportionment Law Appearing as S. J. Res. 1 E, 414 So. 2d 1040, 1051 (Fla. 1982) (holding
that a district lacks contiguity only when a part is isolated from the rest by the territory of another
district, and that because the touching of points means there is no district between two parts of a
single district, point contiguity satisfies the contiguity requirement); Bd. of Superiors of Houghton
v. Blacker, 52 N.W. 951, 953 (Mich. 1892) (holding that islands in the Great Lakes could be
contiguous over water); In re Sherill v. O’Brien, 81 N.E. 124 (N.Y. 1907) (holding that the ordinary
and plain meaning of the word “contiguous” is not a reference to nearness or proximity, but rather
territory which is touching, adjoining, and connected, as distinguished from territory separated by
other territory); Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1244–45 (R.I. 2006); Ariz. Minority Coal.
for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 121 P.3d 843, 849, 869–70 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2005) (holding that a narrow, 103-mile serpentine corridor partially following the Colorado
River through the Grand Canyon to connect two Native American tribes’ reservations into a single
majority-minority district satisfied the contiguity requirement because the district was
geographically connected).
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history, instead requiring at least some nominal connection between the
various points in a district.
3. Preserving Pre-Existing Political Boundaries
Thirty-three state constitutions place limits on dividing local government
units or crossing local government boundaries in the creation of election
districts.177 The most frequently addressed government unit is the county.178
Historically, counties in many cases reflected “communities of interest,”
another traditional redistricting principle in many state constitutions. Early
state constitutions frequently had bicameral legislatures with at least one
house based on representation by county, until Lucas v. 44th General Assembly
of Colorado179 and Reynolds v. Sims180 declared such systems of representation
unconstitutional. These two 1964 cases struck down state prohibitions
against crossing political boundaries and created a requirement that districts
be of near-equal population (the “one person, one vote” requirement).181
A multitude of state courts have found counties to be a critical
“administrative community of interest” due to their performance of critical
governmental functions and their role in interacting with the state
177

178
179
180
181

See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. II, §1(14) (“To the extent practicable, district lines shall use visible
geographic features, city, town and county boundaries, and undivided census tracts.”; CAL. CONST.
art. XXI, §2(d)(4) (“The geographic integrity of any city, county, city and county, local
neighborhood, or local community of interest shall be respected in a manner that minimizes their
division to the extent possible . . . .”); COLO. CONST. art V, §44.3 (2) (a) (“As much as is reasonably
possible, the commission’s plan must preserve . . . whole political subdivisions, such as counties,
cities, and towns.”); IOWA. CONST. art. III, § 37 (“When a congressional district is composed of two
or more counties it shall not be entirely separated by a county belonging to another district and no
county shall be divided in forming a congressional district.”); MD. CONST. art. III, § 4 (“Due regard
shall be given to natural boundaries and the boundaries of political subdivisions.”); N.C. CONST.
art. II, § 3(3) (“No county shall be divided in the formation of a senate district . . . .”); N.C. CONST.
art. III, § 5(3) (“No county shall be divided in the formation of a representative district . . . .”).
In Louisiana, counties are referred to as “parishes.”
377 U.S. 713 (1964).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
For examples of cases striking down districting plans for violating the one person, one vote principle,
see Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Legislative Research Comm’n v. Fischer, 366 S.W.3d
905, 919 (Ky. 2012); Fischer v. State Bd. of Elections, 879 S.W.2d 475, 479 (Ky. 1994); In re
Legislative Districting of State, 805 A.2d 292, 295 (Md. 2002); State ex rel. Teichman v. Carnahan,
357 S.W.3d 601, 607 (Mo. 2012); State ex rel. Lockert v. Crowell, 631 S.W.2d 702, 714–15 (Tenn.
1982); Smith v. Craddick, 471 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1971); Clements v. Valles, 620 S.W.2d 112 (Tex.
1981); In re S.B. 177, 294 A.2d 653 (Vt.), modified, 294 A.2d 657 (Vt. 1972).
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government.182 These cases frequently express concern that the efficiency of
legislative representation would be undermined by crossing county lines.183
There is no consensus among the states as to whether there is a ceiling on the
number of permissible county splits in a plan, or if the number of county
splits is a holistic analysis taken in consideration of the other principles that
are considered when drawing a districting plan. For example, the Colorado
Supreme Court in 1992 used a holistic analysis in striking down a state
legislative district as unconstitutionally noncompact,184 while the Idaho
Supreme Court adopted a rigid ranking of criteria which gave that State’s
prevention of county splits preeminence, second only to federal mandates.185
Similarly, Nebraska follows a practicability standard, requiring that districts
be constructed of whole county units wherever practicable.186 The absence
of a unified approach will require each state to establish its own route to
identifying if and when counties and other political boundaries have been
split too many times.

182

183

184

185

186

In re Legislative Districting of State, 805 A.2d 292, 319 (Md. 2002); In re Reapportionment of Colo.
Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d 1237, 1248 (Colo. 2002); Scrimminger v. Sherwin, 291 A.2d 134, 141 (N.J.
1972); Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 718 (N.J. 1964); Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377,
385 (N.C. 2002).
Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646, 666 (Md. 1993); In re Reapportionment of Towns of
Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 323, 330 (Vt. 1993); Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 553
(Cal. 1992); Brown v. Saunders, 166 S.E. 105, 107–08 (Va. 1932).
In re Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185, 195–96 (Colo. 1992) (holding that making an assertion
that a county split is necessary to comply with other criteria, such as compactness, did not justify
the creation of a protrusion splitting the city of Aspen and Pitkin County). The analysis in this case
highlights the importance of considering traditional redistricting principles in concert with one
another, because state courts frequently consider evidence of a potential violation of one criterion
as supporting evidence for the violation of another criterion.
In other words, counties must be kept whole first before applying any nonfederal criterion. See
Bingham Cty. v. Idaho Comm’n for Reapportionment, 55 P.3d 863, 869 (Idaho 2002).
See Day v. Nelson, 485 N.W.2d 583, 586 (Neb. 1992) (“[T]he only counties in this state where a
single legislative district could lawfully follow the entire county boundaries are Lincoln County and
Madison County. It is obvious that according to the plain language of article III, § 5, Madison
County must constitute a single district unless not ‘practicable.’ It is also obvious that the presence
of a number of proposed plans that apportion the state leaving District 21 substantially intact makes
following that county’s boundaries ‘practicable.’ The suggestion by the State in its brief that the
process is entirely political ignores the mandatory ‘shall’ in the constitutional section and would
equate it with the permissive ‘may.’”).
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4. Preserving Communities of Interest
Of all the criteria considered by most states, perhaps the most malleable
and least quantifiable187 yet, of central conceptual importance, is that districts
preserve “communities of interest.” The justification of states considering
communities of interest in the redistricting process was well stated in Maestas
v. Hall: “The rationale for giving due weight to clear communities of interest
is that to be an effective representative, a legislator must represent a district
that has a reasonable homogeneity of needs and interests; otherwise the
policies he supports will not represent the preferences of most of his
constituents.”188
A few states define communities of interest.189 Among the more specific
provisions, the Alaska Constitution defines communities of interest as “a
relatively integrated socioeconomic area.”190 The California Constitution
describes a community of interest as a “contiguous population which shares
common social and economic interests that should be included within a
single district for purposes of fair representation . . . [such as] an urban area,
a rural area, an industrial area, or an agricultural area” as well as “those
common to areas in which the people share similar living standards, use the
same transportation facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have access

187

188
189

190

An empirical approach to defining communities of interest is described by Stephen J. Malone in his
article Recognizing Communities of Interest in a Legislative Apportionment Plan, 83 VA. L. REV. 461, 480
(1997):
Yet a community of interest may still exist within the district because of inherent socioeconomic characteristics among district residents that cause them to share the same
concerns. In such situations, empirical data may identify these latent communities of
interest. Census data on population density, race, national origin, income, education,
ancestry, occupation, religion and household size can point to commonalities within the
population that may indicate the existence of a community of interest.
With the rise of Big Data, it is not outside the realm of possibility that things such as Google search
terms, or purchasing habits, could also be used to define such definitions. The diametric approach
would be to use only data collected by the Census. But speculating on the scope of how to
empirically capture a community of interest is beyond the scope of this Article.
274 P.3d 66, 78 (N.M. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
Apart from the states set out below, Vermont also provides a definition of community of interest
beyond a bare-bones recitation of the phrase. Vt. Stat., tit. 17, § 1903(b)(2) (2018) (“The
representative and senatorial districts shall be formed consistent with the following policies insofar
as practicable: . . . recognition and maintenance of patterns of geography, social interaction, trade,
political ties, and common interests.”).
ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
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to the same media of communication relevant to the election process.”191
Colorado, meanwhile, defines communities of interest in terms of “issues”
voters care about, such as issues of education, employment, environment,
public health, transportation, water needs, or issues of demonstrable regional
significance.192 Colorado goes further, explicitly noting that racial, ethnic,
and language minority groups could also constitute communities of
interest.193 California and Colorado explicitly prohibit political parties,
incumbents, or candidates from factoring into any consideration of what
constitutes a community of interest.194 Most states195 leave the term wholly
undefined, leaving it up to legislatures and courts to read meaning into the
phrase.196
There is also precedent for using the concept of communities of interest
in the absence of statutory or constitutional language. Alabama and
191

192
193
194

195

196

CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4). Additionally, several California Commissioners described to
members of the Princeton Gerrymandering Project and graduate students at Princeton University’s
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs that the “public comment” process
inherent in California’s independent Citizens Redistricting Commission was a useful tool for
defining communities of interest. Thus, litigants can look to public input sessions for information
on what considerations may have been made by legislators in creating districts, and whether public
input was heeded or disregarded.
COLO. CONST. amend. Z.
Id.
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4) (“Communities of interest shall not include relationships with
political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.”); COLO. CONST. amend. Z (“‘Community of
interest’ does not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.”).
Thirty-one states require that either their congressional or state legislative districts (or both) be
drawn with communities of interest in mind: nine by constitutional provision, eight by statute, the
rest by resolutions or guidelines. For examples of states without definitions of the phrase, see, e.g.,
ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. II, § 1(14)(D) (“District boundaries shall respect communities of interest
to the extent practicable . . . .”); N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4 (“The Commission shall consider . . .
communities of interest.”). For an example of resolutions adopted by legislatures or guidelines laid
out by commissions, see Redistricting Criteria Approved by the Courts, ARK. BOARD OF
APPORTIONMENT, http://www.arkansasredistricting.org/redistricting-criteria (last visited Oct. 12,
2019).
Courts have gone far afield. In Hall v. Moreno, 270 P.2d 961, 975–80 (Colo. 2012), the Supreme
Court of Colorado identified the following “communities of interest”: regulation of oil and gas
development in light of fracking; agricultural lands; Hispanic voting strength; the Western Slope;
water scarcity; local units of government; Rocky Flats radioactive cleanup; the I-70 corridor; Rocky
Mountain national park; the pine bark beetle kill infestation; state universities; health and high-tech
industries; rural populace; ranching; mining; tourism; alternative energy production;
unemployment rate; mass transportation; open space and wildlife; military bases; and infrastructure
improvement.
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Arkansas give consideration to communities of interest despite no
constitutional mandate to do so. Conversely, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court has frowned upon attempting to argue a common law right to the
representation of communities of interest in districting.197 Thus the concept
of communities of interest is potentially available in the construction of a
complaint, but highly dependent on the willingness of a court in applying
such reasoning.
IV. EVIDENTIARY BURDENS: ORGANIZING GERRYMANDERING TESTS
INTO TESTS OF INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND INEQUITABLE
OUTCOME
Because each state has multiple constitutional provisions upon which a
well-pleaded complaint could be founded, the key question is how to prove
such a claim. While many excellent articles have recently been written on
this very question pertaining to proof for Free and Equal Elections Clause
claims (as occurred in Pennsylvania), cookie-cutter evidence to prove other
constitutional claims will not suffice.198 A wide variety of statistical tests is
available to courts to evaluate the degree to which a district or statewide plan
has treated a political party unfairly. These tests can be thought of as falling
into two major categories: inequality of opportunity and inequitable
outcome.
For example, if political party A’s average wins are much larger than the
others, that would be evidence that the wins had been engineered to pack
many of party A’s voters into a few districts, while cracking their other voters
197

198

See City of Manchester v. Sec’y of State, 48 A.3d 864, 878 (N.H. 2012) (holding that “[n]othing in
the New Hampshire Constitution requires a redistricting plan to consider ‘communities of
interest,’” and that, “although preservation of communities of interest [may be] a legitimate
redistricting goal,” it does not mean that there is an individual right to have one’s particular
community contained within a district). See also In re Legislative Districting of State, 475 A.2d 428,
445 (Md. 1984), appeal dismissed sub nom. Wiser v. Hughes, 459 U.S. 962 (1982) (mem.).
See Bernard Grofman & Jonathan Cervas, Can State Courts Cure Partisan Gerrymandering: Lessons from
League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (2018), 17 ELECTION L. J. 264 (2018).
Joshua Douglas at the University of Kentucky has produced excellent work on the similar, yet
slightly adjacent issue of the right to vote under state constitutions. See Joshua Douglas, The Right to
Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89 (2015). However, Mr. Douglas’s work predates
the decision in League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and does not address its potential
future impacts.
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across many other districts to allow wins by party B. This would constitute
a systematic deprivation of the opportunity to elect representatives at a
statewide level. The same districting pattern could be examined to see
whether it has led to inequities of representational outcome. A variety of tests
of outcome have been developed, including the efficiency gap,199 non-mapbased computer simulation,200 and detailed examination of maps using
Monte Carlo map drawing methods.201
It should be noted that the appropriate tests will vary by state. For
example, closely divided states such as North Carolina would be most
appropriately tested using measures of partisan symmetry such as the
lopsided wins test or the reliable wins test. A more lopsided partisan state
such as Maryland would benefit from an examination of whether a districting
plan was drawn to give excessively uniform wins to Democratic voters, thus
allowing Democrats to win more districts than would be expected from a
more natural pattern.202 In all cases, a detailed examination of alternative
maps provides a way of testing whether the actual map gives an exceptional
advantage to a political party, in the context of the state’s particular
geographic and political circumstances, as well as the specific laws governing
redistricting in that state.203
V. A STATE-BY-STATE VIEW OF FIELD OF PLAY
With causes of action abounding in state constitutions, the next question
reformers must ask is whether a court is the likeliest route for achieving a
remedy. This can be difficult to ascertain. Unlike federal courts, judges in
199

200

201

202

203

See Nick Stephanopoulos & Eric McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 831, 900 (2015).
See Sam Wang, Let Math Save Our Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/12/06/opinion/sunday/let-math-save-our-democracy.html.
See Ben Fifield et al., A New Automated Redistricting Simulator Using Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(July 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://imai.fas.harvard.edu/research/files/redist.pdf.
Monte Carlo map-drawing methods involve taking a starting map, or “seed” map, and running a
computer program which makes very small changes many, many times.
For a treatment of how to select tests, see Michael D. McDonald, Making a Case for Two Paths Forward
in Light of Gill v. Whitford, 17 ELECTION L.J. 315, 316 (2018); Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Practical
Tests for Gerrymandering: Application to Maryland and Wisconsin, 15 ELECTION L.J. 367, 376 (2016).
See Gregory Herschlag et al., Quantifying Gerrymandering in North Carolina (Jan. 9, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.03783.pdf.
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state courts are selected via a variety of methods: lifetime appointments,
appointments with retention elections, and partisan or nonpartisan elections.
State court judges’ opinions may be colored by the ramifications for their
continued employment.204 On the flip side, the nominal political party of the
judge may not always reflect how judges will decide an issue.
Nonetheless, partisanship provides a starting point for evaluating the tilt
of a court. We believe there are three broad categories of state courts which
may be receptive to partisan gerrymandering claims: first, states where a
substantial fraction of the high court’s membership is of opposite partisanship
to the state legislature that drew an offending plan; second, courts that are
philosophically inclined to take an expansive view of voting rights; and third,
courts with histories of policing redistricting. This Part will highlight
examples of states which exemplify these reform opportunities.205 Details for
all states can be found in Appendix B.
A. Philosophically Inclined Towards Expansive Views of Voting Rights: Pennsylvania
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the
Commonwealth’s congressional partisan gerrymander, observers and
legislators noted that the decision may not have been based on the law, but
instead stemmed from a partisan divide: the Court was controlled by
Democrats, while Republicans dominated the state legislature.206 Some
members of the legislature were so incensed by the decision that they
204

205

206

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (“Under our precedents there are
objective standards that require recusal when ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge
or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’ Applying those precedents, we find
that, in all the circumstances of this case, due process requires recusal.”) (internal citations omitted).
These categories are not mutually exclusive; it is possible (if not probable) that several states will fall
into multiple categories. Those multiple-category states are very ripe for partisan gerrymandering
challenges in their courts.
See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Refuses to Block Pa. Ruling Invalidating Congressional Map, WASH.
POST (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-courtrefuses-to-block-pa-ruling-invalidating-congressional-mapdecision-means-2018-elections-in-the-st
ate-will-probably-be-held-in-districts-far-more-favorable-to-democrats/2018/02/05/2d758f90-0a
a3-11e8-8890-372e2047c935_story.html; David Jackson, Trump Urges Pennsylvania Republicans to Take
Congressional District Map Fight to High Court, USA TODAY (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/02/20/trump-urges-pennsylvania-republ
icans-take-congressional-district-map-fight-high-court/354088002/; Joseph Ax, Supreme Court
Upholds Pennsylvania Election Map in Win for Democrats, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politics-pennsylvania/supreme-court-upholds-pennsylva
nia-election-map-in-win-for-democrats-idUSKBN1GV2BZ.
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threatened to impeach the justices in the majority. The decision was seen as
a threat to the independence of the judiciary,207 and Republican leadership
ultimately did not take up the impeachment movement.208
B. The Opposite Party of the Offending Legislature: North Carolina
The North Carolina electorate is closely divided between Democrats and
Republicans, and partisan warfare there has been especially bitter over the
last decade. North Carolina is also a state where redistricting is not subject
to gubernatorial veto.209 Thus, without a check on its power, the dominant
party in the General Assembly can potentially maintain power indefinitely.
The congressional and legislative district maps of North Carolina are among
the most biased in the nation210 and have inspired a tremendous amount of
litigation.211 Under these circumstances, a judicial check takes on central
importance.
In 2018, Anita Earls was elected to the North Carolina Supreme Court,
changing the court from four Democrats, three Republicans to five
Democrats, two Republicans.212 Justice Earls is also known for her advocacy
of voting rights. (In light of recent retirements, the Democrats now
command an imposing 6–1 majority on the State’s supreme court.)
Reformers brought a lawsuit within one week of the 2018 election. They
contended that the state legislative plan violated three separate provisions of
207

208

209

210

211

212

Jan Murphy, PA Supreme Court Chief Justice Sees Impeachment Resolutions as ‘Attack Upon an Independent
Judiciary,’ PENNLIVE (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.pennlive.com/politics/2018/03/
pa_supreme_court_chief_justice.html.
See Pennsylvania Lawmakers Threaten to Impeach Judges, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.wa
shingtonpost.com/opinions/pennsylvania-lawmakers-threatened-to-impeach-state-judges-its-a-da
ngerous-trend/2018/03/27/be83cd78-312f-11e8-94fa-32d48460b955_story.html.
Justin Levitt, All About Redistricting: Professor Justin Levitt's Guide to Drawing the Electoral Lines,
http://redistricting.lls.edu/states-NC.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
State-by-State Redistricting Reform: The Local Routes, PRINCETON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT,
http://gerrymander.princeton.edu (last visited Aug. 20, 2019). This, of course, may change
following the conclusion of the Lewis case’s remedial phase.
See All About Redistricting: Professor Justin Levitt's Guide to Drawing the Electoral Lines,
http://redistricting.lls.edu/states-NC.php#litigation (last visited Aug. 20, 2019).
The North Carolina GOP went to exceptional lengths to try to prevent Justice Earls from winning
her seat on the court, repeatedly changing the laws around election to the court in an effort to
bolster the Republican incumbent. In the end, two Republicans and Earls ran on the partisan
ballot, with Earls winning by double-digits. See Will Doran, Democrat Anita Earls Claims Victory in NC
Supreme Court Race, NEWS & OBSERVER (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.newsobserver.com/
news/politics-government/article221037190.html.
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the North Carolina Constitution: the Equal Protection Clause, the Free
Elections Clause, and the Free Speech and Association clauses.213
Defendants made a motion to move the case to federal court. Because of the
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the case was remanded to the state
court.214
In the Superior Court, a three-judge panel unanimously found that the
plan was unconstitutional and ordered it to be redrawn. The court cited
twenty-seven North Carolina precedent cases in the section of its opinion
dealing with claims under the North Carolina Constitution, ten of them
construing the “Fair Elections” provision (four of which were decided in the
19th century), seven construing Equal Protection, six construing Free Speech
and Assembly, and nine on expression. The depth of case law on the “Fair
Elections” provision relied heavily on state rather than federal cases. The
other subsections relied heavily on U.S. Supreme Court decisions, especially
that of Justice Kagan in Gill.215 Legislators declined to appeal the case to the
North Carolina Supreme Court, perhaps because doing so would create a
binding precedent for future cases.
C. A History of Policing Gerrymanders: Maryland
Maryland has a history of judicially reviewing districting plans, focused
on the issue of compactness. Since the legislative compactness provision was
added to the state constitution in 1972, the Maryland Court of Appeals has
considered the issue of compactness each decade. In 1982, the court went
so far as to say that the compactness provision was an anti-partisan
gerrymandering constitutional amendment:
[T]he compactness requirement in state constitutions is intended to prevent
political gerrymandering. Oddly shaped or irregularly sized districts of
themselves do not, therefore, ordinarily constitute evidence of
gerrymandering and noncompactness. On the contrary, an affirmative
showing is ordinarily required to demonstrate that such districts were
intentionally so drawn to produce an unfair political result, that is, to dilute
or enhance the voting strength of discrete groups for partisan political
advantage or other impermissible purposes. Thus, irregularity of shape or

213
214
215

See Common Cause v. Lewis, 358 F. Supp. 3d 505, 507–08 (E.D.N.C. 2019).
Id. at 507.
Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, slip op. at 298 (N.C. Super Ct. Sept. 3, 2019).
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size of a district is not a litmus test proving violation of the compactness
requirement.216

In the end, the Court of Appeals declined to strike down the plan, instead
showing deference to the legislature. After the 1990 redistricting cycle, faced
with another compactness case, the Court once again declined to strike down
a plan as unconstitutionally noncompact.217
In 2002, the Court of Appeals finally struck down a legislative districting
plan as unconstitutionally noncompact.218 In so doing, the court clarified the
previously broad deference granted to the legislature, stating that while the
responsibility to redistrict requires the latitude to consider factors mandated
by the constitution as well as other factors (which may well be political in
nature), the constitution ultimately trumps political considerations.219 While
the Court declined to rule on the compactness challenge to state legislative
districts in 2011, the Court of Appeals’ willingness to strike down legislative
districting plans in the past may make them predisposed to make a similar
ruling about the state’s congressional gerrymander or other future
gerrymanders.220
This route for litigation would have to be balanced against the fact that
another route for redress is available. Maryland redistricting requires the
signature of the Governor, at this time Larry Hogan, a Republican.
Reformers may be able to achieve less partisan redistricting in the 2020 cycle
that way.

216
217
218
219

220

In re Legislative Districting of the State, 475 A.2d 428, 436–40 (Md. 1982).
Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646, 658 (Md. 1993).
In re Legislative Districting of the State, 805 A.2d 292, 295 (Md. 2002).
Id. at 326 (“That a plan may have been the result of discretion, exercised by the one entrusted with
the responsibility of generating the plan, will not save it. The constitution ’trumps’ political
considerations. Politics or non-constitutional considerations never ’trump’ constitutional
requirements.”).
Like Pennsylvania and North Carolina, Maryland’s Constitution guarantees that all elections must
be “free and frequent.” MD. CONST. art. VII. However, the provision comes after a reference to
the legislature, so it may be limited to legislative elections. Even if that is the case, the Maryland
Constitution protects freedom of speech, freedom of association, the equal protection of the laws,
and the purity of elections. See infra Appendix A.
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CONCLUSION
With fifty different judicial systems evolving their own histories and
doctrines, it is inevitable that some states will emerge with more active
judiciaries in the redistricting context than others. Some states have a history
of requiring judicial review of at least some of their plans. Other states simply
have a history of scrutinizing redistricting schemes over the years.221
Reformers should consult the precedents of their individual state supreme
courts to find histories of review. Even if they do not find a broad history of
policing gerrymandering claims, decisions on other election law issues may
invite an opening to similar decisions in the redistricting context. If the U.S.
Supreme Court takes limited action or fails to act, federalism offers states an
opportunity to take a locally specific approach to placing guardrails on the
practice of partisan gerrymandering.

221

Examples include Alaska, California, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, and Missouri.
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APPENDIX A:
Table 1: Major Cases Striking Down Redistricting Plans Under State Constitutional
Protections222

222

State

Case Name

Citation

Pertinent
Constitutional
Provisions

Florida

Apportionment I

83 So.3d 597
(2018)

Prohibition on
partisan
gerrymandering

California

Assembly of State
of Cal. v.
Deukmejian

639 P.2d 939
(1982)

One Person, One
Vote (state & fed)

Idaho

Bingham Co. v.
Idaho Comm’n
for
Reapportionment

55 P.3d 863
(2002)

One Person, One
Vote (state & fed)
Preexisting Political
Boundaries

Virginia

Brown v.
Saunders

166 S.E. 105
(1932)

One Person, One
Vote (state & fed)

Illinois

Burris v. Ryan

588 N.E.2d
1023 (1991)

Compactness
One Person, One
Vote

Alaska

Carpenter v.
Hammond

667 P.2d 1204
(1983)

Compactness
One Person, One
Vote (state)
Communities of
Interest

While state-level issues are frequently intertwined with federal claims, the fact that those cases are
almost universally heard in federal court means they are not indicative—necessarily—of state
judges’ thought processes, regardless of how well the federal judges guess their intent as required
by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). As a result, the authors have decided to exclude
those cases from this paper.
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North
Carolina

Common Cause v.
Lewis

18 CVS
014001, slip
op. (Wake
County, N.C.
Super
Ct. Sept. 3,
2019)

Free Elections
Equal Protection
Freedom of Speech
Freedom of Assembly

Nebraska

Day v. Nelson

485 N.W.2d
583 (1992)

Preexisting Political
Subdivisions

Idaho

Hellar v.
Cenarrusa

682 P.2d 539
(1984)

Equal Protection
(state & federal)
Right to Vote
Preexisting Political
Subdivisions

Alaska

Hickel v.
Southeast
Conference

846 P.2d 38
(1992)

Communities of
Interest
Compactness

Alaska

In re 2001
Redistricting
Cases

44 P.3d 141
(2002)

Compactness
One Person, One
Vote (state & fed)

Maryland

In re Legislative
Districting of State

805 A.2d 292
(2002)

Preexisting Political
Subdivisions
Not Following
Natural Boundaries

New York

In re Livingston

160 N.Y.S. 462
(Sup. Ct.,
Kings Co.,
1916)

Compactness

Colorado

In re
Reapportionment
of Colo. Gen.
Assembly

45 P.3d 1237
(2002)

Preexisting Political
Subdivisions
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Vermont

In re
Reapportionment
of Towns of
Hartland,
Windsor & W.
Windsor

624 A.2d 323
(1993)

Communities of
Interest

Florida

In re S. J. Res. of
Leg.
Apportionment
1176

83 So.3d 597
(2012)

Prohibition on
Partisan
Gerrymandering

Alaska

Kenai Peninsula
Borough v. State

743 P.2d 1352
(1987)

Equal Protection
(state)

Florida

League of Women
Voters of Fla. v.
Detzner

172 So.3d 363
(2015)

Prohibition on
Partisan
Gerrymandering

Pennsylvania

League of Women
Voters of
Pennsylvania v.
Commonwealth

181 A.3d 1083
(2018)

Free and Equal
Elections

Colorado

Mauff v. People

123 P. 101
(1912)

Purity of Elections

Colorado

Neelley v. Farr

158 P. 458
(1916)

Freedom of Speech
(state)
Freedom of Assembly
(state)
Free and Open
Elections

Missouri

Pearson v. Koster

359 S.2.3d 35
(2012)

Compactness
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Colorado

People ex rel.
Salazar v.
Davidson

79 P.3d 1221
(2003)

Prohibition on middecade Redistricting

New Jersey

Scrimminger v.
Sherwin

291 A.2d 134
(1972)

One Person, One
Vote (federal)
Preexisting Political
Subdivisions

Missouri

State ex rel. Barrett
v. Hitchcock

146 S.W. 40
(1912)

Compactness
Preexisting Political
Subdivisions

West Virginia

State ex rel. Smith
v. Gore

143 S.E.2d 791
(1965)

One Person, One
Vote (state)

North Dakota

State v. Hamilton

129 N.W. 916
(1910)

Uniform Laws

Delaware

Young v. Red
Clay Consol. Sch.
Dist.

122 A.3d 784
(Del. Ch. 2015)

Elections Clause
(state’s Equal
Protection clause for
election issues)

Table 2: Major Cases Striking Down Election Laws Under State Constitutional
Protections
State

Case Name

Citation

Pertinent
Constitutional
Provisions

Kentucky

Ferguson v. Rohde

449 S.W.2d 758
(1970)

Free & Fair
Elections (ballot
construction)

New
Mexico

Gunaji v. Macias

31 P.3d 1008
(2001)

Free & Open
Elections (counting
of ballots)
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Kentucky

Hillard v. Lakes

172 S.W.2d 456
(1943)

Free and Fair
Elections (ballot
construction)

Missouri

Kasten v. Guth

375 S.W.2d 110
(1964)

Right to Vote (for
write-in candidates)

Kentucky

Lakes v. Estridge

172 S.W.2d 454
(1943)

Right to Vote
Free & Fair
Elections (denial of
ballot)

Kentucky

Lee v.
Commonwealth

565 S.W.2d 634
(1978)

Prohibition on
Special Laws
(campaign finance)

California

Serrano v. Priest

557 P.2d 929
(1976)

Equal Protection
(state) (public school
financing)

Michigan

Socialist Workers
Party v. Sec’y of
State

317 N.W.2d 1
(1982)

Purity of Elections
Equal Protection
(state)
First Amendment
(federal)
Fourteenth
Amendment
(federal) (ballot
access)

Michigan

Wells v. Kent
County Bd. of
Elections Comm’rs

186 N.W.2d 222
(1969)

Purity of Elections
(ballot design)
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APPENDIX B:
Table 3: State Constitutional Provisions, Power Balances within States in 2021, and
Whether the Political and Judicial Branches are Politically Opposed223
State Name
&
Relevant
Citations
Alabama
I§4

Freedom of
Assembly

I §§ 1, 6

Due Process

I §§ 1, 22

Equal Protection

#Reapportionm
ent Committee
2011

Compactness

IX § 200

Contiguity

IV § 104(29)

Trifecta in
2021
guaranteed
as of
10/2019?

State High
Court
Opposed to
Legislature?

Yes

No

Freedom of Speech

I § 25

IX § 200

223

Relevant
Constitutional
&Statutory
Provisions
& Guidelines

No Splitting Preexisting Political
Boundaries
No Uniform/Special
Laws

For guidance on ascertaining whether particular judges may be receptive to these arguments on
partisan gerrymandering, see Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 Ohio St. L.J. 1,
48 (2016).
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Alaska**
I§5

Freedom of Speech

I§6

Freedom of
Assembly

I§7

Due Process

I§1

Equal Protection

VI § 6

Compactness

VI § 6

Contiguity

VI § 6

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

VI § 6

Communities of
Interest

II § 19

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Arizona
II § 6

Freedom of Speech

II § 5

Freedom of
Assembly

II § 4

Due Process

II §§ 1–2, 13

Equal Protection

II § 21

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

VII § 12

Purity of
Elections/Ballot

IV Pt2 § 1(15)

No Gerrymandering
for Party

IV Pt2 § 1(15)

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020
(districts drawn
by commission)

No

260
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IV Pt2 § 1(14)F

Encourage
Competition

IV Pt2 § 1(14)C

Compactness

IV Pt2 § 1(14)C

Contiguity

IV Pt2 § 1(14)E

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

IV Pt2 § 1(14)D

Communities of
Interest

IV Pt2 § 19

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Arkansas
II § 6

Freedom of Speech

II § 4

Freedom of
Assembly

II § 8

Due Process

II § 3

Equal Protection

III § 2

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

#Board of
Apportionment

No Gerrymandering
for Party

#Board of
Apportionment

Compactness

VIII § 3

Contiguity

VIII § 3

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

#Board of
Apportionment

Communities of
Interest

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No
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~No
Uniform/Special
Laws

California**
I § 2(a)

Freedom of Speech

I § 3(a)

Freedom of
Assembly

I§7

Due Process

I§7

Equal Protection

II § 3; IV § 1.5

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

II § 4

Purity of
Elections/Ballot
(prohibits improper
practices)

XXI § 2(e)

No Gerrymandering
for Party

XXI § 2(e)

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

XXI § 2(d)(5)

Compactness

XXI § 2(d)(3)

Contiguity

XXI § 2(d)(4)

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

XXI § 2(d)(4)

Communities of
Interest

IV § 16

No Uniform/Special
Laws

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020
(districts drawn
by commission)

No
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Colorado**
II § 10

Freedom of Speech

II § 24

Freedom of
Assembly

II § 25

Due Process

II § 5

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

VII § 11

Purity of
Elections/Ballot

V §§ 44.3, 48.1

No Gerrymandering
for Party

V §§ 44.3, 48.1

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

V §§ 44.3, 48.1

Encourage
Competition

V §§ 44.3, 48.1

Compactness

V §§ 44.3, 48.1

Contiguity

V §§ 44.3, 48.1

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

V §§ 44.3, 48.1

Communities of
Interest

V § 25

No Uniform/Special
Laws

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020
(districts to be
drawn by
commission)

No
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Connecticut
I§4

Freedom of Speech

I § 14

Freedom of
Assembly

I§8

Due Process

I § 20

Equal Protection

VI § 4

Purity of
Elections/Ballot
(prohibits improper
conduct)

III §§ 3, 4

Contiguity

III § 4

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

Delaware
I§5

Freedom of Speech

I § 16

Freedom of
Assembly

I§7

Due Process

I§3&V§1

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

V§1

Purity of
Elections/Ballot

II § 2A

No Gerrymandering
for Party

II § 2A

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

II § 2A

Contiguity

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No

No; Legislative
and Governor
Elections
In 2020

No

264
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Florida
I§4

Freedom of Speech

I§5

Freedom of
Assembly

I§9

Due Process

III §§ 20, 21

No Gerrymandering
for Party

III §§ 20, 21

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

III §§ 20, 21

Compactness

III §§ 20, 21

Contiguity

III §§ 20, 21

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

Georgia
I § 1, ¶V

Freedom of Speech

I § 1, ¶IX

Freedom of
Assembly

I § 1, ¶I

Due Process

I § 1, ¶II

Equal Protection

#2011
Reapportionme
nt Committee

Compactness

III § 2, ¶II

Contiguity

#2011
Reapportionme
nt Committee

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

#2011
Reapportionme
nt Committee

Communities of
Interest

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No
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No Uniform/Special
Laws

Hawaii**
I§4

Freedom of Speech

I§4

Freedom of
Assembly

I§5

Due Process

I§5

Equal Protection

IV § 6

No Gerrymandering
for Party

IV § 6

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

IV § 6

Compactness

IV § 6

Contiguity

IV § 6

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

IV § 6

Communities of
Interest

Idaho**
I§9

Freedom of Speech

I § 10

Freedom of
Assembly

I § 13

Due Process

I§2

Equal Protection

Stat. 72-1506(8)

No Gerrymandering
for Party

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No
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Stat. 72-1506(8)

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

Stat. 72-1506(4)

Compactness

III § 5

Contiguity

III § 5

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

Stat. 72-1506(2)

Communities of
Interest

Illinois
I§4

Freedom of Speech

I§5

Freedom of
Assembly

I§2

Due Process

I§2

Equal Protection

III § 3

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

III § 4

Purity of
Elections/Ballot
(integrity)

IV § 3(a)

Compactness

IV § 3(a)

Contiguity

IV § 13

No Uniform/Special
Laws

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No
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Indiana
I§9

Freedom of Speech

I § 31

Freedom of
Assembly

I§1

Due Process

I § 12

Equal Protection

II § 1

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

IV § 5

Contiguity

IV § 23

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Iowa
I§7

Freedom of Speech

I § 20

Freedom of
Assembly

I§9

Due Process

Stat. 42.4(5)

No Gerrymandering
for Party

Stat. 42.4(5)

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

Leg § 34

Compactness

Leg § 34

Contiguity

Leg § 37

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

Leg § 30

No Uniform/Special
Laws

No; Legislative
and Governor
Elections
In 2020

No

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020
(districts drawn
by commission)

No
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Kansas
BR § 11

Freedom of Speech

BR § 3

Freedom of
Assembly

BR § 18

Due Process

BR § 2

Equal Protection

#Guidelines
and Criteria
for 2012
Redistricting

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No

No; Legislative
and Governor
Elections
In 2019

No

Communities of
Interest

#Guidelines
and Criteria
for 2012
Redistricting

Compactness

#Guidelines
and Criteria
for 2012
Redistricting

Contiguity

#Guidelines
and Criteria
for 2012
Redistricting

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

II § 17

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Kentucky
BR § 1(fourth), 8

Freedom of Speech

BR § 1(sixth)

Freedom of
Assembly

BR §§11, 14

Due Process

BR § 3

Equal Protection
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BR § 6

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

Leg § 33

Contiguity

Leg § 33

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

#1991
Redistricting
Subcommittee
Guidelines

Communities of
Interest

Leg § 59

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Louisiana
I§7

Freedom of Speech

I§9

Freedom of
Assembly

I§2

Due Process

I§3

Equal Protection

#2011 Senate &
Governmental
Affairs
Committee
Rules for
Redistricting

Contiguity

#2011 Senate &
Governmental
Affairs
Committee
Rules for
Redistricting

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

No; Legislative
and Governor
Elections
In 2019

No
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Maine
I§4

Freedom of Speech

I § 15

Freedom of
Assembly

I § 6-A

Due Process

I § 6-A

Equal Protection

IV 1st § 2;
IX § 24

Compactness

IV 1st § 2;
IX § 24

Contiguity

IV 1st § 2;
IX § 24

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

St21-A § 1206A

Communities of
Interest

Maryland
DR §§ 10, 40

Freedom of Speech

DR § 24

Due Process

DR § 19

Equal Protection

DR § 7

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

I§7

Purity of
Elections/Ballot

III § 4

Compactness

III § 4

Contiguity

III § 4

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

III § 33

No Uniform/Special
Laws

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

Yes

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No

November 2019]
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Massachusetts
LXXVII

Freedom of Speech

1st XIX

Freedom of
Assembly

1st X

Due Process

1st Am. CVI

Equal Protection

1st Art. IX

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

Am. CI §§ 1, 2

Contiguity

Am. CI §§ 1, 2

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

Michigan**
I§5

Freedom of Speech

I§3

Freedom of
Assembly

I § 17

Due Process

I§2

Equal Protection

II § 4(2)

Purity of
Elections/Ballot

IV § 6(13)(d)

No Gerrymandering
for Party

IV § 6(13)(e)

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

IV § 6(13)(g)

Compactness

IV § 6(13)(b)

Contiguity

IV § 6(13)f)

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020
(districts to be
drawn by
commission)

No
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IV § 6(13)(c)

Communities of
Interest

IV § 29

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Minnesota
I§3

Freedom of Speech

I§7

Due Process

#S.F. No. 1326

No Gerrymandering
for Party

#S.F. No. 1326

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

IV § 3

Contiguity

Stat. 2.91

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

#S.F. No. 1326

Communities of
Interest

XII § 1

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Mississippi
III § 13

Freedom of Speech

III § 11

Freedom of
Assembly

III § 14

Due Process

XII § 247

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

Code § 5-3-101

Compactness

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No

No; Legislative
and Governor
Elections
In 2019

No

November 2019]
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XIII § 254

Contiguity

Code § 5-3-101

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

IV § 87

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Missouri**
I§8

Freedom of Speech

I§9

Freedom of
Assembly

I § 10

Due Process

I §§ 2, 14

Equal Protection

I § 25

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

III §§ 3(c), 7

No Gerrymandering
for Party

III §§ 3(c), 7

Encourage
Competition

III §§ 3(c), 7, 45

Compactness

III §§ 3(c), 7, 45

Contiguity

III §§ 3(c), 7

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

III § 40

No Uniform/Special
Laws

No; Legislative
and Governor
Elections
In 2020
(districts to be
drawn by
nonpartisan
demographer
and approved
by legislature)

Yes
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Montana**
II § 7

Freedom of Speech

II § 6

Freedom of
Assembly

II § 17

Due Process

II § 4

Equal Protection

II § 13

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

IV § 3

Purity of
Elections/Ballot

Code 5-1-115(3)

No Gerrymandering
for Party

Code 5-1-115(3)

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

V § 14(1)

Compactness

V § 14(1)

Contiguity

Code 5-1-115(2)

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

#2010
Districting
Apportionment
Commission

Communities of
Interest

V § 12

No Uniform/Special
Laws

No; Legislative
and Governor
Elections
In 2020

No
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Nebraska
I§5

Freedom of Speech

I § 19

Freedom of
Assembly

I§3

Due Process

I§3

Equal Protection

I § 22

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

#2011
Legislative
Resolution 102

No Gerrymandering
for Party

#2011
Legislative
Resolution 102

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

III § 5

Compactness

III § 5

Contiguity

III § 5

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

III § 18

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Nevada
I§9

Freedom of Speech

I § 10

Freedom of
Assembly

I § 8.2

Due Process

II § 6

Purity of
Elections/Ballot

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No
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Guy v. Miller,
No. 11 OC
00042 1B, 2011
WL 7665875, at
*6 (D. Nev. Oct.
27, 2011)

Compactness

IV § 5

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

IV §§ 20–21

No Uniform/Special
Laws

New
Hampshire
1st § 22

Freedom of Speech

1st § 32

Freedom of
Assembly

1st § 15

Due Process

1st §§ 2, 6

Equal Protection

1st § 11

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

2nd §§ 11, 26

Contiguity

2nd §§ 9, 11, 26

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

No; Legislative
and
Gubernatorial
Elections
In 2020

No

November 2019]

New Jersey**
I§6

Freedom of Speech

I § 18

Freedom of
Assembly

IV § II(3)

Compactness

IV § II(1), (3)

Contiguity

IV § II(1), (3)

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

New Mexico
II § 17

Freedom of Speech

II § 18

Due Process

II § 18

Equal Protection

II § 8
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Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

VII § 1(B)

Purity of
Elections/Ballot

Stat § 2-8D-2

Compactness

Stat § 2-7C-3

Contiguity

#Guidelines for
Redistricting
2011

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

#Guidelines for
Redistricting
2011

Communities of
Interest

IV § 24

No Uniform/Special
Laws

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2019
(districts drawn
by commission)

Yes

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No
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New York
I§8

Freedom of Speech

I § 9(1)

Freedom of
Assembly

I§6

Due Process

I § 11

Equal Protection

III § 4(c)(5)

No Gerrymandering
for Party

III § 4(c)(5)

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

III § 4(c)(4)

Compactness

III § 4(c)(3)

Contiguity

III § 4(a), (c)(6)

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

III § 4(c)(5)

Communities of
Interest

III § 17

No Uniform/Special
Laws

North Carolina
I § 14

Freedom of Speech

I § 12

Freedom of
Assembly

I § 19

Due Process

I § 19

Equal Protection

I § 10

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

II §§ 3(2), 5(2)

Contiguity

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No

Single-party
control since
governor does
not have veto
power over
districting plan;
Legislative and
Governor
Elections
In 2020

Yes
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II §§ 3(3), 5(3)

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

XIV § 3

No Uniform/Special
Laws

North Dakota
I§4

Freedom of Speech

I§5

Freedom of
Assembly

I§9

Due Process

IV § 2

Compactness

IV § 2

Contiguity

IV § 13

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Ohio**
I § 11

Freedom of Speech

I§3

Freedom of
Assembly

I § 16

Due Process

I§2

Equal Protection

XI § 6(A)

No Gerrymandering
for Party

XI § 6(B)

Encourage
Competition

XI § 6(C)

Compactness

XI §§ 3(B), 4(A)

Contiguity

XI § 3(C), (D)

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

No; Legislative
and Governor
Elections
In 2020

No

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No
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II § 26

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Oklahoma
II § 22

Freedom of Speech

II § 3

Freedom of
Assembly

II § 8

Due Process

III § 5

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

V § 9A

Compactness

V § 9A

Contiguity

V § 9A

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

V § 9A

Communities of
Interest

V § 59

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Oregon
I§8

Freedom of Speech

I § 26

Freedom of
Assembly

I § 10

Due Process

I § 20

Equal Protection

II § 1

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

Stat. 188.010

No Gerrymandering
for Party

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

Yes

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No
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Stat. 188.010

No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

IV § 7

Contiguity

IV § 7

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

Stat. 188.010

Communities of
Interest

Pennsylvania
I§7

Freedom of Speech

I § 20

Freedom of
Assembly

I§9

Due Process

I§5

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

II § 16; VII § 9

Compactness

II § 16; VII § 9

Contiguity

II § 16

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

III § 32

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Rhode Island
I §§ 20, 21

Freedom of Speech

I § 21

Freedom of
Assembly

I§2

Due Process

I§2

Equal Protection

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No
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VII § 1; VIII § 1

Compactness

St11-100, -106

Contiguity

St11-100, -106

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

South Carolina
I§2

Freedom of Speech

I§2

Freedom of
Assembly

I§3

Due Process

I§3

Equal Protection

I§5

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

#2011
Redistricting
Guidelines

Compactness

#2011
Redistricting
Guidelines

Contiguity

#2011
Redistricting
Guidelines

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

#2011
Redistricting
Guidelines

Communities of
Interest

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No

November 2019]
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South Dakota
VI § 5

Freedom of Speech

VI § 4

Freedom of
Assembly

VI § 2

Due Process

VI §§ 1, 26

Equal Protection

VI § 19; VII § 1

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

III § 5

Compactness

III § 5

Contiguity

Code 2-2-41(3)

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

Code 2-2-41(2)

Communities of
Interest

III § 23

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Tennessee
I § 19

Freedom of Speech

I § 23

Freedom of
Assembly

I§8

Due Process

I§5

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

IV § 1

Purity of
Elections/Ballot

Cd3-102, -103

Contiguity

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No
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II § 5 & 6

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

XI § 8

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Texas
I§8

Freedom of Speech

I § 27

Freedom of
Assembly

I § 19

Due Process

I §§ 3a, 13

Equal Protection

VI §§ 2, 4

Purity of
Elections/Ballot

III § 25, 26

Contiguity

III § 26

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

III § 56

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Utah
I § 15

Freedom of Speech

I§1

Freedom of
Assembly

I§7

Due Process

I § 17

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

Cd20A-19-103

No Gerrymandering
for Party

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No

No; Legislative
and Governor
Elections
In 2020
(districts to be
drawn by
commission and
approved by
legislature)

No
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No Gerrymandering
for
Person/Incumbent

Cd20A-19-103

Compactness

Cd20A-19-103

Contiguity

Cd20A-19-103

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

Cd20A-19-103

Communities of
Interest

I § 24; VI § 26

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Vermont
I § 13

Freedom of Speech

I § 20

Freedom of
Assembly

I§4

Due Process

I§8

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

I§8

Purity of
Elections/Ballot

II § 13, 18

Compactness

II § 13, 18

Contiguity

III § 13, 18

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

St17:34A1903

Communities of
Interest

No; Legislative
and Governor
Elections
In 2020

No
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Virginia
I § 12

Freedom of Speech

I § 12

Freedom of
Assembly

I § 11

Due Process

I § 11

Equal Protection

I§6

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

II § 6

Compactness

II § 6

Contiguity

#Exec. Order
No. 31 (2011)

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

#Comm. on
Privileges &
Elections

Communities of
Interest

IV §§ 14, 15

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Washington
I§5

Freedom of Speech

I§4

Freedom of
Assembly

I§3

Due Process

I § 12

Equal Protection

I § 19

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

II § 43(5)

No Gerrymandering
for Party

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2019

No

No; Legislative
and Governor
Elections
In 2020

No
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Cd44.05.090(5)

Encourage
Competition

II § 43(5)

Compactness

II §§ 6, 43(5)

Contiguity

Cd44.05.090(2)

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

Cd44.05.090(2)

Communities of
Interest

West Virginia
III § 7

Freedom of Speech

III § 16

Freedom of
Assembly

III § 10

Due Process

I § 4; VI § 4

Compactness

I § 4; VI §§ 4, 6

Contiguity

Cd § 1-2-1(c)(4)

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

Cd § 1-2-1(c)(5)

Communities of
Interest

VI § 39

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Wisconsin
I§3

Freedom of Speech

I§4

Freedom of
Assembly

I §§ 1 & 8

Due Process

I §§ 9, 15

Equal Protection

IV § 4

Compactness

No; Legislative
and Governor
Elections
In 2020

No

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No
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IV §§ 4, 5

Contiguity

IV §§ 4, 5

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

Cd4.001(3)

Communities of
Interest

IV § 32

No Uniform/Special
Laws

Wyoming
I § 20

Freedom of Speech

I § 21

Freedom of
Assembly

I§6

Due Process

I§3

Equal Protection

I § 27

Free and
Equal/Open
Elections

VI § 13

Purity of
Elections/Ballot

III § 49

Compactness

III § 49

Contiguity

III § 49

No Splitting PreExisting Political
Boundaries

I §§ 27, 34

No Uniform/Special
Laws

No; Legislative
Elections
In 2020

No
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^Puerto Rico**
II § 4

Freedom of Speech

II § 4

Freedom of
Assembly

II § 2

Purity of
Elections/Ballot
(protect against
coercion)

II § 7

Due Process

II § 7

Equal Protection

III § 4

Compactness

III § 4

Contiguity

No; Legislative
and Governor
Elections
In 2020
(districts are
drawn by a
commission)

No

Note: Washington, D.C. is omitted from this list because its Supreme
Court is the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, meaning it is subject to federal
review regardless of its own charter.
Legend
**= Commission states (independent or partisan)
^= not a state
Cd= state code
#=reference to guidelines of legislative committees or state agencies
~=State constitutional provision in Art. 5, Sec. 25 prohibiting special or
local law is discretionary, not mandatory, for the legislature to follow. See
Haase v. Starnes, 323 Ark. 263 (1996)
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